The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof
Session Seventy-Two
The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, First Topic: The Literal or Figurative Nature of the Attribution, Possibilities in Figurative Attribution, The First Possibility and Its Examination, The Second Objection, The Second Possibility, Commentary on the Treatise on Rights, The Meaning of Worship Possessing a Right
January 14, 2026
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion was on what is that implied omitted element (muqaddar), considering that the attribution of lifting to “ma la ya’lamun” (that which they do not know) is figurative, which necessitates implying a word as omitted to legitimize the attribution. We said there are several possibilities in this regard.
The first possibility was that the word “punishment” (al-mu’akhadhah) is implied as omitted. On this basis, the meaning of the hadith is that the punishment for ma la ya’lamun is lifted. That is, lifting is attributed to ma la ya’lamun, but through the medium of the word “punishment”; for this very reason, its attribution is figurative.
This possibility is afflicted with several objections. We explained the first objection yesterday. The first objection was that punishment is the action of the Lawgiver and in His control, and this is an ontological matter and has no connection to the duty-bound (mukallaf), and since the lifting here is legislative, it cannot attach to punishment, which is the action of the Master and is an ontological matter. We explained this yesterday along with a counter-objection (in qulta) and its response (qultu) stated below it.
Question: …
Professor: We said that if the punishment is negated, it is because the duty was apparently not established, not actually; according to “And We would never punish until We sent a messenger,” there must be a deputation of a messenger so that punishment would follow it, and until there is a deputation of messengers, there is no punishment, and until there is a declaration of the duty, there is no punishment. Therefore, punishment was negated, but the negation of punishment is dependent upon the duty not being established; otherwise, if the duty is established, punishment and discipline are also established.
Question: …
Professor: Yes; the Lawgiver can report (ikhbar), it is not a legislative formulation (insha’). “And We would never punish until We sent a messenger” reports that We do not punish either the past nations, the subsequent nations, or you, until there is a declaration and an obligation. Here He reports His own action. Ontologically, He can also lift it and say: I do not punish on the Day of Resurrection as long as it has not been like this; He reports His own action, and this is ontological, not legislative. Now, the assumption here is that the lifting is legislative and in reality speaks about the duty-bound: “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” (lifted is that which the people do not know); “the people have latitude regarding what they do not know” (al-nasu fi sa’atin ma la ya’lamun). If the lifting is legislative, and ma la ya’lamun is also what the people do not know, here the Lawgiver can say: I legislatively lift the punishment. The legislative lifting of punishment for what the people do not know is fundamentally meaningless; the legislative lifting with respect to ontological punishment is meaningless.
The Second Objection
The apparent meaning of “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” is that it wants to say that in the domain of legislation, doubt, ignorance, error, coercion, and their likes do not exist, and its apparent meaning is that what relates to the duty-bound, and to which one of these descriptions applies in a way, has no place at all in the world of legislation; not that it only wants to remove punishment.
In other words, punishment is among the effects that can result from each of these descriptions. When lifting attaches to these descriptions themselves, it means as if everything that relates to this description is lifted, not specifically the punishment. Suppose there are various effects for each of these descriptions; now, if we take specifically the punishment from among these effects, this is contrary to the attribution of lifting to these matters. If there were a clue for exclusivity—such that, for example, only one of these effects is lifted in a way—we would accept it, but there is no clue for exclusivity.
Question: …
Professor: Incidentally, what does the suitability of the ruling and the subject (tanasub al-hukm wa al-mawdu’) require? What is the ruling and what is the subject? The ruling is lifting, and the subject is error, forgetfulness, coercion, and what they do not know. Lifting is also a legislative lifting; the suitability of legislative lifting with these matters is not restricted to punishment. The very suitability of the ruling and the subject, according to the apparent meaning, dictates that the effects related to the domain of legislation are removed. Therefore, you cannot say that the lifted object is punishment by virtue of the clue of suitability between the ruling and the subject. Thus, the second objection is that punishment is only one of the effects related to these descriptions, and the legislative lifting that attaches to these descriptions consists, in part, of multiple effects that are in some way related to the issue of legislation. We shall examine all effects (jami’ al-athar) later; currently, we are examining the lifting of specifically punishment.
Question: …
Professor: We say it is not restricted to this. That is, here, in the position of legislative lifting, there are effects related to these descriptions, and although the requirement of lifting these effects is also the absence of punishment, we are not concerned with its consequence; these are objections that are sometimes raised, and we do not intend to solve them here. Yes, regarding envy (hasad), for example, it may be said that it is not of the genus of these cases, and what relation does it have to these? These are objections we must answer later; when we say there is no punishment and it is a legislative lifting, the question arises: what relation do these have to envy and whisperings regarding creation (al-waswasah fi al-khalq)?
Question: …
Professor: It is not clear that it is the most obvious of effects (adhhar al-athar). We shall examine the second possibility mentioned by Sheikh Ansari, namely, “the suitable apparent effect” (al-athar al-zahir al-mutanasib). Incidentally, each of these has an effect suitable to itself; for example, the apparent effect of divorce is validity (sihhah). Or, the apparent effect of drinking wine is its legal punishment (hadd). When He says that this is lifted in the domain of legislation, it means its legal punishment is removed; therefore, it is not the case that punishment is the most obvious of effects.
What emphasizes this point is some narrations in which the issue of punishment is fundamentally not raised.
On the authority of Abu al-Hasan (PBUH): Regarding a man who is made to swear an oath, and he swears by divorce, manumission (‘itaq), and giving in charity (sadaqah) what he possesses: is he bound by that? He (PBUH) said: No; the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said: “Removed from my nation is that which they are coerced into, that which they cannot bear, and that which they commit by error…”
According to this narration, regarding someone who is coerced into swearing an oath to divorce, to free a slave, or to give something of his wealth in charity… (none of the matters by which he swore are forbidden; divorce, manumission, and charity are among permissible matters) the discussion is: since he was bound to the oath and coercion was involved, does it create an obligation for him or not? The Imam said: No. Then he (PBUH) cited this hadith that the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said: “Removed from my nation is that which they are coerced into”; here, the issue of punishment is fundamentally meaningless.
Question: …
Professor: No; here he says: is he bound by that? Meaning: are its effects entailed or not? He says: since he swore an oath, must he perform this deed, and if he does this deed, does it have an effect? The Imam says: No, and it has no effect… It does not contradict, but… I transmitted the narration to show that specifically punishment is not intended, it does not contradict, let there also be punishment… The first possibility was that the implied element is specifically punishment; our submission was that this is fundamentally not feasible, and secondly, the apparent meaning of the attribution of lifting to these matters is that, in part, the effects related to it are intended, not specifically punishment. We also brought this narration to show that specifically punishment is not intended; this is a case where, at least, other matters were also intended.
Therefore, the conclusion is that the Hadith of Lifting did not come to lift specifically punishment, and this is definitely established. Sheikh Ansari states in Al-Rasa’il: swearing an oath by divorcing one’s wife, freeing a slave, or giving in charity what one possesses, even in a state of free will, is void according to the Imami school. If the Imam (PBUH) cites this hadith here, it shows that the Hadith of Lifting is not exclusive to punishment.
Thus, the first possibility is rejected.
The Second Possibility
The legitimizing factor for the figurative attribution is the apparent effect related to and suitable with each of these descriptions. We cannot say in a general manner that in ma la ya’lamun, punishment or a specific effect is removed; it depends on what ma la ya’lamun is. For example, if ma la ya’lamun is the ruling of drinking wine or one does not know that this is ontologically wine, the effect related to it or the apparent effect suitable with it is removed. The effect suitable with drinking wine is the legal punishment (hadd), meaning it wants to say that drinking wine whose ruling or subject with its conditions is unknown has no legal punishment. Or, for example, divorce that occurs due to coercion—this is “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh”—regarding every action there is an effect: from coerced drinking of wine, the legal punishment is lifted; from coerced divorce, validity is negated. Now, even in this itself, there is a difference. Therefore, we cannot say in an absolute manner that in cases of ma la ya’lamun, a specific effect is removed. In each case of necessity, ma la ya’lamun, and coercion, the effect related to it is removed.
Question: …
Professor: This is open to discussion. Sheikh Ansari himself has cited this narration in Al-Rasa’il. That is, he brought this narration as a support that the Imam cited this hadith showing that it is not exclusive to specifically punishment, even if it is out of dissimulation (taqiyyah), it does not harm this citation. Because this hadith wants to say that when someone is coerced into swearing an oath by these matters, it does not create an obligation for him. Regardless of this ruling, the Imam’s citation of this narration is what we are concerned with; currently, we have nothing to do with its ruling. That the Imam cited this narration, even if that ruling is out of dissimulation… does not create any harm in this matter that the Hadith of Lifting is not exclusive to punishment; as for there being dissimulation in a part of the narration, that is another discussion.
Question: …
Professor: Sheikh Ansari explicitly states that swearing an oath by these matters, even in a state of free will, is void according to the Imami school, let alone in the case of coercion; but the main point is that, in any case, this citation negates specifically punishment.
Commentary on the Treatise on Rights
The Imam (PBUH) stated: “And as for the right of fasting, it is that you know it is a veil that Allah has placed over your tongue, your hearing, your sight, your private parts, and your stomach, so that He may shield you by it from the Fire.”
In the past two sessions, we first gave a brief explanation regarding this passage and then very briefly referred to the importance of fasting, pointing out how important fasting is.
The Imam (PBUH) referred to the right of fasting in this passage of the Treatise on Rights. After mentioning the rights of human organs and limbs, the Imam (PBUH) stated the rights of some acts of worship. First was prayer, then pilgrimage (hajj), and now fasting. We previously mentioned that the very fact that he considers a right for an act of worship like fasting is itself a noteworthy point. That is, fasting is considered as possessing a right; just as prayer had rights, and just as hajj had rights, fasting also has rights.
The Meaning of Worship Possessing a Right
In conceptualizing how fasting possesses a right as an act of worship—as we previously referred to it—we must say that fasting is an act of worship whose reality was invented by the Lawgiver; meaning He created a set of omissions with a specific intention under the name of fasting in the conventional world (‘alam-e i’tibar).
Now, how does this conventional reality possess a right? External fasting is realized after our action; meaning when the duty-bound abstains from certain matters from morning to night, it is said “he fasted” (sama), and his fasting is realized. Or, prayer is realized when the duty-bound stands facing the qiblah with specific conditions and performs the prayer; here, the external existence of prayer is realized. However, once it is realized, it makes no sense to say that it possesses a right. This indicates that each of these acts of worship possesses a reality in the celestial realm (‘alam-e malakut). The reality of prayer and fasting, which according to some traditions becomes personified and manifested for the human in the purgatorial world (‘alam-e barzakh), is an entity. It might be said that the fact that prayer appears as light in the purgatorial world for individuals is the very embodiment of the action they performed; for someone who prays, since his actions are embodied in purgatory and on the Day of Resurrection, that light is in fact the embodiment of his external action in this world. This might be said. However, the discussion is on how the act of worship like fasting is conceptualized as possessing a right. Is it like other entities—human beings and nature—for which we assume a right; meaning a realized entity, whether material or immaterial, whose rights we must observe? Humans have a right over one another. Trees and water possess rights, and these rights are upon our shoulders. When we say the right of fasting is this, must we conceptualize this as an entity beyond the material world, a luminous reality, a reality in the celestial realm which has this right? Because the discussion here is on rights, and not in the sense of “and it is fitting and proper” that it should be like this. How can this right be conceptualized?
Sometimes when we say the “right” of prayer and fasting is this, it means it is fitting, proper, and necessary for prayer to have these effects. However, sometimes what is meant by the right of fasting, prayer, and pilgrimage is higher than this; meaning it does not [merely] want to say “and it is fitting and proper” (wa haqiqun wa yaliqu), it is fitting and proper that prayer, fasting, and hajj should have these results. The apparent meaning of mentioning these acts of worship alongside the organs, limbs, and also the classes of people mentioned here is that this is an entity and possesses a reality that has rights; otherwise, if we want to take the right in the second sense, it would be of a completely different nature and realm than the rights of the organs, limbs, and the rights of the teacher, neighbor, ruler, and so forth.
On this basis, it is as though fasting has a reality which, if it is to be personified, becomes personified in the form of light, brightness, and beauty. This is an important discussion: what is the existential reality of acts of worship? At any rate, fasting has a very important right.