The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Seventy-Nine

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, Second Topic: Examination of the Exclusivity or Non-Exclusivity of “ma” to Particular Doubts, The Five Paths, The Third Path, The Responses to the Third Path, Examination of the Second Response, The Fourth Path and Its Examination, The Fifth Path and Its Examination

January 26, 2026

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion was regarding the third of the paths for proving the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts. The third path, as was explained, is a hypothetical syllogism; in the sense that if the Hadith of Lifting, or the word raf’ (lifting) in this hadith, were to encompass both ruling-directed doubts (shubhat hukmiyyah) and particular doubts (shubhat mawdu’iyyah), it would necessitate that the attribution of lifting in this hadith be both literal (haqiqi) and figurative (majazi); however, this consequent (tali) is void and impossible. Therefore, the Hadith of Lifting is exclusive to particular doubts, or in other words, does not encompass ruling-directed doubts.

We transmitted two responses from the late Mr. Khoei. We objected to the first response. The second response was that if the lifting in this hadith is ontological, the attribution in all these phrases is figurative. We do not have two types of attribution such that that corrupt matter is necessitated; in all these cases, the attribution is figurative. Nonetheless, they claimed the figurative nature of the attribution in terms of the speech, even though they stated that in terms of reality and analysis, the attribution is figurative in some phrases and literal in others.

Examination of the Second Response

However, this response also appears incomplete. For us to say that the attribution is figurative in terms of the speech, but in terms of reality and analysis, it is literal in some cases and figurative in others, it is not very clear what he means.

He claims that in all these matters, the attribution has been made to a common denominator (qadr-e jami’). This itself is, in fact, one of the paths of exclusivity that we shall mention later, or one of the responses that some have presented. However, to say that there is a difference between the analysis and reality of the speech and the speech itself, and in one to say that the attribution is figurative in all phrases and in the other to say that the attribution is figurative in some phrases and literal in others, is unacceptable.

Ultimately, we are left with this narration in which “lifting” is attributed to “ma” (that which). “Ma” is repeated both in the beginning of the narration and in the phrases of the narration: it states: “rufi’a ‘an ummati tis’un: al-khata’u wa al-nisyanu wa ma-stukrihu ‘alayhi wa ma la ya’lamuna wa ma la yatiquna wa ma-dturru ilayhi wa al-hasadu wa al-tiyaratu wa al-tafakkuru fi al-waswasah…” (lifted from my nation are nine: error, forgetfulness, that which they are coerced into, that which they do not know, that which they cannot bear, that which they are constrained to, envy, omens, and contemplating whisperings…). Ultimately, the attribution of “lifting” to “ma” is either literal or figurative. Sometimes the word relative pronoun ma is interpreted in a way that it becomes figurative in all cases, and sometimes it is interpreted in a way that it is literal in some cases and figurative in others. For us to distinguish between the speech and the reality of the speech, and in one to believe in figurative use with respect to all phrases and in the other to believe in a detailed classification (that in some phrases it is figurative and in others literal), truly has no rational root, basis, or foundation. Ultimately, this speech comprises this textual attribution; this attribution is either figurative or literal. Distinguishing between these two positions is completely unjustified.

The Third Response

In our view, the truth of the matter is this response, and this is the very same one we previously transmitted from Muhaqqiq Ha’iri in response to the second path, which was also the foundation of Muhaqqiq Khoei’s response to the second path—namely, that in phrases such as “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh” or “ma-dturru ilayh”, what is meant by ma is certainly action; because necessity and coercion are meaningless with respect to the ruling. However, the basis of his response was that since the external instance of coercion and necessity is action, must we say this attribution is figurative? The late Mr. Ha’iri explained, and we also accepted, that ma in all these phrases is utilized in its literal meaning; namely, “the ambiguous thing” (al-shay’ al-mubham). This ambiguous thing can externally apply to an action and can apply to a ruling. Now, when “lifting” is attributed to “ma” (meaning the lifting of this ambiguous thing, whether this ambiguous thing applies to an external action or applies to a religious ruling), is it literal or figurative?

He states: lifting is directed toward that ambiguous thing. That ambiguous thing is in some place “ma-dturru ilayh”, that to which they are constrained. In some place it is “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh”, that which they are coerced into. This can apply to action or ruling. However, is the attribution of lifting to “ma” and the ambiguous thing—whether it be action or ruling—literal or figurative? Prior to this, we explained that this attribution cannot be literal; because that ambiguous thing itself is not lifted. That ambiguous thing, which is in some place the action itself, is inherently incapable of being lifted; the lifting is apparent.

Therefore, the attribution of lifting to “ma” is certainly figurative; because we are forced to imply a word as omitted (taqdir). It cannot be a literal attribution; because neither that action itself can be removed, nor that ambiguous thing itself, but rather its effects are removed. Hence, we said that we require a legitimizing factor (musahhih) and must imply a word as omitted in order for this attribution to be correct. Therefore, regardless of the possibility of what he stated, it appears that the problem is that the attribution of lifting to ma is not literal. We previously rejected the proof of Muhaqqiq Na’ini. Therefore, his saying that in all of these the attribution is literal is not accepted.

Some seek to state through another formulation that this attribution is a literal attribution. How can the attribution be both literal and the lifting attach to these matters themselves? If the attribution is literal, there is no longer any need for us to imply something as omitted. We say that since lifting cannot attach to these matters themselves, we must say there must be a figurative use in the attribution; whether a figurative use in the word or in the attribution. Or rather, some say that this attribution is literal because there is no problem at all in attributing lifting to these matters themselves, because the lifting is a claimed lifting (raf’ iddi’a’i), not an actual lifting. There is a difference between actual lifting and claimed lifting. Of course, this is different from actual and apparent lifting.

We previously raised a discussion regarding the word raf’, as to whether this lifting is apparent or actual, where we concluded that this lifting is apparent, not actual.

Regarding lifting, first we said raf’ is in its literal meaning, not daf’; second, we said the lifting here is in the meaning of apparent lifting, not actual; third, we said that the relative pronoun ma here certainly cannot be these matters themselves in some of the phrases, such as “ma la yatiqun” and their likes, but rather what is meant is the objects of these matters. We also stated that, on this occasion, it is discussed whether the attribution of lifting to these objects is literal or figurative; we raised this discussion.

The Fourth Path and Its Examination

The Fourth Path: This path consists of two premises:

The First Premise

When it says: “lifted from my nation are nine” (rufi’a ‘an ummati tis’ah), regardless of Him having named these nine cases, it is understood through two clues; that the matter which is lifted is heavy (burdening).

The First Clue: The word raf’ itself. Fundamentally, the concept of lifting indicates that the lifted object is something heavy. If some one comes and says: I lifted this—this ruling, this prohibition, or this thing—it becomes clear that this was heavy and has been lifted. Therefore, first, the concept of lifting itself conveys this.

The Second Clue: Fundamentally, this hadith was introduced in the position of imtinan (granting a favor), and the position of imtinan also dictates that the matter which is lifted is heavy.

Therefore, the first premise is that the lifted object is a heavy matter, and this was clarified by two clues.

The Second Premise

This heaviness is, as a rule, related to the duty-bound (mukallaf); meaning that matter was heavy for the duty-bound and was therefore lifted, so it relates to the duty-bound. Now the question is: Is action heavy for the duty-bound, or is the ruling? Certainly the action, because action is the work of the duty-bound. The ruling is the work of the Master and the Lawgiver, and has fundamentally nothing to do with the duty-bound. Therefore, that which is lifted relates to the action (meaning an external subject), not the ruling.

Conclusion

That the Hadith of Lifting does not encompass ruling-directed doubts.

Examination of the Fourth Path

This path has also been answered:

The First Response

This claim that particular doubts—meaning external actions—are lifted from the duty-bound as a heavy matter, does it encompass both types of doubts, namely, obligatoriness-directed doubts (shubhat wujubiyyah) and prohibition-directed doubts (shubhat tahrimiyyah), or is it exclusive to obligatoriness-directed doubts? Because particular doubts are themselves of two types: one type is obligatoriness-directed doubts, such as whether Friday prayer is obligatory; obligatoriness-directed doubts relate to action (whether an action is obligatory or not). The second type is prohibition-directed doubts, such as whether smoking tobacco is forbidden or not. In prohibition-directed doubts we no longer have action, but rather the omission of action or the non-existence of action.

This claim that it is a heavy matter apparently must only encompass obligatoriness-directed doubts; because it is an action that is heavy for the duty-bound, and this is removed. However, omission or non-existence of action is no longer an action. Of course, this objection is not very important; because we may say that the non-existence of action and omission of action is also heavy; when prohibition is lifted, this heaviness, this heavy burden, is as if lifted. The first objection is not very important.

The Second Response

If the action is heavy for the duty-bound, it is due to the ruling. We have an action, such as prayer and fasting. We have a ruling and duty; that which is in reality heavy is that ruling and duty which attaches to the action. It says: Friday prayer is obligatory. Had this ruling not been obligatory, it would have had no heaviness. Had such-and-such been forbidden, it would have had no heaviness. Therefore, contrary to the view of the claimant who says that what is heavy is the action, and otherwise the ruling is the work of the Master, we submit: the legislation of the ruling is the work of the Master; yes, this is a settled matter. However, that this ruling binds the duty-bound, that the ruling attaches to the action of the duty-bound, causes the heaviness. Therefore, in reality, the heaviness relates to the ruling, not the action.

Question: …

Professor: No, I am not saying the action; I am saying that if the action possesses heaviness, it is in view of the ruling. That is, lawla al-hukmu (were it not for the ruling), would the action have any heaviness? Yes, actions are different; some actions are difficult, some are easy. However, when the Lawgiver, as an imtinan, lifts a heavy matter, He wants to say: from my side, no heaviness is directed toward you. The heaviness that can direct from the side of the legislator to bind the duty-bound is the ruling, not the action itself; because the necessity of performing this deed is heavy. Otherwise, if a deed has no necessity, it is possible that the deed is inherently difficult, but someone performs it with passion and love, and for him it has no heaviness at all; it is fundamentally not heavy for him, even if in the view of most people it is heavy. However, heaviness in the domain of law and its lifting by the legislator is only from the side of the ruling. If the legislator places a duty upon the shoulders of the people, this duty—even if the action itself is light, for example, rise from sleep every morning and recite a remembrance (not even prayer, just in bed)—has heaviness in itself; the root of the heaviness is born of the duty. Now, the action can be heavy, and it can not be.

The Fifth Path and Its Examination

The Fifth Path: If we believe that “la ya’lamun” is broader, encompassing both ruling-directed and particular doubts, its requirement is the utilization of a word in more than one meaning. Because this word has been utilized both in ruling-directed doubts and in particular doubts. “ma la ya’lamun” must be utilized both in action and in ruling. The relative pronoun ma, in some place is in the meaning of action, and in another in the meaning of ruling. Therefore, utilizing the word ma as a relative pronoun in the meaning of the ruling and in the meaning of the action is the utilization of a word in more than one meaning, which is impossible and impermissible.

Examination of the Fifth Path

The First Response

The response to this path is also clear in light of what we have stated. In response to the second and third paths, we referred to the fact that ma is utilized in its own literal meaning, and that is “the ambiguous thing”. Yes, in the stage of application, sometimes it applies to action, sometimes to the ruling, and sometimes to both—like “la ya’lamun” which applies to both. However, this is different from utilization (isti’mal). The utilization of the word ma is in that very “ambiguous thing,” and this is utilization in a single meaning, and the utilization is also literal.

The Second Response

The basis of this foundation is itself open to discussion. Although it is famous that utilizing a word in more than one meaning is impermissible or impossible. In past years, following some of the researchers including Imam Khomeini, we stated: utilizing a word in more than one meaning is permissible and is not impossible either.

Therefore, the fifth path is also invalidated.