Session Forty, The Proofs of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being
Session Forty
The Proofs of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being — The Second Proof: Traditions (Riwayāt) — The Fifth Group — The First and Second Traditions — The Sixth Group — The First Tradition — An Objection and Its Response — The Second Tradition — The Seventh Group — The First and Second Traditions
May 10, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion concerned the proofs of inherent dignity, and that God the Almighty has granted specific blessings to the human being and established a specific privilege, nobility, and ennoblement for the human being; the scope of this ennoblement is a matter we shall discuss later. We noted that various groups of traditions indicate this meaning; we mentioned four groups in the previous sessions, and other groups exist.
We present these merely as examples, otherwise many chapters of Kitāb al-ʿIshrah (which contains many traditions in Wasāʾil al-Shīʿah as well as in al-Kāfī; and of course, other traditional compendiums also have this section) can be utilized as evidence in our discussion. Setting aside some of the traditions in which the word “believer” (muʾmin), “Muslim” (muslim), “brother of the believer” (akh al-muʾmin), or absolute “brother” (akh) is mentioned, many traditions are free from these attributes—meaning they establish certain effects and rulings for the human being qua human being. I believe that a large portion of the traditions in Kitāb al-ʿIshrah can be utilized in our discussion. What we have mentioned so far is virtually separate from those chapters in Kitāb al-ʿIshrah that can be invoked.
The Fifth Group
The fifth group consists of traditions that entail the prohibition of belittling and humiliating people, warning us against humiliating and belittling others, unless a secondary or accidental title arises. For example, if someone displays arrogance and intends to humiliate the human being, permission for reciprocal treatment may have been granted against him. However, the principle that the human being cannot humiliate others is definitive, and belittling others is prohibited. I shall mention two or three examples.
The First Tradition
The first tradition: “From Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar ibn Yazīd, from his father, who said: ‘I said to Abū ʿAbdillāh (peace be upon him): Verily, I eat good food, smell good fragrance, ride an excellent beast, and am followed by a servant; do you see in this any tyranny, so that I should refrain from it? Abū ʿAbdillāh (peace be upon him) lowered his head, then said: Indeed, the cursed tyrant is he who belittles the people and is ignorant of the truth. ʿUmar said: I said: As for the truth, I am not ignorant of it; but as for belittling (ghamṣ), I do not know what it is. He said: He who humiliates the people and tyrannizes over them—that is the tyrant'” (عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عُمَرَ بْنِ يَزِيدَ عَنْ أَبِيهِ قَالَ قُلْتُ لِأَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ إِنَّنِي آكُلُ الطَّعَامَ الطَّيِّبَ وَ أَشَمُّ الرَّائِحَةَ الطَّيِّبَةَ وَ أَرْكَبُ الدَّابَّةَ الْفَارِهَةَ وَ يَتْبَعُنِي الْغُلَامُ فَتَرَى فِي هَذَا شَيْئاً مِنَ التَّجَبُّرِ فَلَا أَفْعَلَهُ فَأَطْرَقَ أَبُو عَبْدِ اللَّهِ ثُمَّ قَالَ إِنَّمَا الْجَبَّارُ الْمَلْعُونُ مَنْ غَمَصَ النَّاسَ وَ جَهِلَ الْحَقَّ قَالَ عُمَرُ فَقُلْتُ أَمَّا الْحَقُّ فَلَا أَجْهَلُهُ وَ الْغَمْصُ لَا أَدْرِي مَا هُوَ قَالَ مَنْ حَقَّرَ النَّاسَ وَ تَجَبَّرَ عَلَيْهِمْ فَذَلِكَ الْجَبَّارُ).
Ghamṣ means humiliating and belittling the people. The Imam states: the cursed tyrant is he who treats the people in a humiliating manner; the cursed tyrant, the cursed oppressor, is he who treats the people in this way. Because he asks about ghamṣ, the Imam states: who humiliates the people and tyrannizes over them (مَنْ حَقَّرَ النَّاسَ وَ تَجَبَّرَ عَلَيْهِمْ فَذَلِكَ الْجَبَّارُ). This absolute expression encompasses all people; it does not say “he who humiliates the believer.” To be sure, we have numerous traditions prohibiting the humiliation of the Muslim and prohibiting the insult of the believer, but they differ according to their results and effects; yet the absolute prohibition of humiliating, insulting, and belittling the people, independent of these aspects, carries its own significance.
The Second Tradition
The second tradition: “Luqmān said to his son: O my son! Do not humiliate anyone because of his worn-out clothes, for indeed your Lord and his Lord are one” (قَالَ لُقْمَانُ لِابْنِهِ يَا بُنَيَّ لَا تُحَقِّرَنَّ أَحَداً بِخُلْقَانِ ثِيَابِهِ فَإِنَّ رَبَّكَ وَ رَبَّهُ وَاحِدٌ). This is the advice of Luqmān to his son; it might be objected that this is not from an Infallible, but after all, Luqmān is adjacent to the Infallibles, and perhaps he was even a prophet. He says: do not humiliate anyone because of his worn-out clothes, for indeed your Lord and his Lord are one (لَا تُحَقِّرَنَّ أَحَداً بِخُلْقَانِ ثِيَابِهِ فَإِنَّ رَبَّكَ وَ رَبَّهُ وَاحِدٌ). This encompasses all servants.
The Sixth Group
The sixth group consists of traditions related to the treatment of the People of the Book—comprising Jews and Christians. In these traditions, recommendations have been made regarding certain matters and aspects related to their human needs, or the neglect of these rights has been prohibited. What can we interpret these as? When he recommends taking care of an elderly Christian man, what does this mean? Is it other than that he is a human being who has a minimum of needs that it is everyone’s duty to fulfill? The government in its proper place must… let no one say either that these all relate to the protected non-Muslim citizens (dhimmis) and that these recommendations were made because they were under the protection of Islam and the Islamic government; because in none of these traditions is this aspect mentioned. All of those recommendations and injunctions are focused on the human aspect.
The First Tradition
The first tradition: “From Muḥammad ibn Abī Ḥamzah, from a man who related it to the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him), who said: ‘An elderly, blind man passed by begging. The Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) said: What is this? They said: O Commander of the Faithful, he is a Christian. The Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) said: You employed him until he grew old and became incapacitated, and now you deprive him? Spend on him from the public treasury'” (عَنْ مُحمدِ بْنِ أَبِي حَمْزَةَ عَنْ رَجُلٍ بَلَغَ بِهِ أَمِيرَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ قَالَ مَرَّ شَيْخٌ مَكْفُوفٌ كَبِيرٌ يَسْأَلُ فَقَالَ أَمِيرُ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ مَا هَذَا قَالُوا يَا أَمِيرَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ نَصْرَانِيٌّ فَقَالَ أَمِيرُ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ اسْتَعْمَلْتُمُوهُ حَتَّى إِذَا كَبِرَ وَ عَجَزَ مَنَعْتُمُوهُ أَنْفِقُوا عَلَيْهِ مِنْ بَيْتِ الْمَالِ).
The Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) passed by an elderly blind man who was begging. The Imam stated: Who is this? What is he doing? Those around him said to the Imam: He is a Christian. Their tone was as though it was of no consequence for a Christian to sit by the street and beg—as though begging and mendicancy were of no consequence for a Christian; because he is a Christian, it is of no consequence if he experiences such humiliation and abasement. The Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) stated: You employed him until he grew old and became incapacitated, and now you deprive him of his needs (اسْتَعْمَلْتُمُوهُ حَتَّى إِذَا كَبِرَ وَ عَجَزَ مَنَعْتُمُوهُ أَنْفِقُوا عَلَيْهِ مِنْ بَيْتِ الْمَالِ). The Imam commanded that they spend on him from the public treasury (Bayt al-Mal).
Is this other than that the Imam was not pleased that a human being should be thus humiliated and abased, even if he is a disbeliever? Ultimately, this itself indicates that the human being, even if a disbeliever, must benefit from a minimum of needs and rights. Therefore, we cannot argue that he possesses no respect whatsoever, so we should abandon him and leave him to live in this manner.
An Objection
An objection may arise here concerning this group of traditions and some traditions we read previously (as indeed some have argued) that perhaps this sensitivity was because they had a contract with the government and were considered dhimmis.
Response to the Objection
We presented a similar response to this objection in the tradition related to the injustice committed against the Jewish woman. We answered there that fundamentally there is no reference to the aspect that because he is a dhimmi or lives under the shadow of the Islamic government, the government must protect dhimmis… social security or insurance… some have relied on this tradition to argue that the government has a duty to protect its citizens and subjects at a certain age; we are not presently concerned with that aspect. It is as though the Imam objects: What state of affairs is this? Why is this elderly man begging in this state? In their minds, because this elderly man was Christian, it was of no consequence for him to beg. The Imam states: until he was young, you employed him, and now when he has become needy, you say leave him to beg (اسْتَعْمَلْتُمُوهُ حَتَّى إِذَا كَبِرَ وَ عَجَزَ مَنَعْتُمُوهُ أَنْفِقُوا عَلَيْهِ مِنْ بَيْتِ الْمَالِ)? Consequently, he commanded to give to him from the public treasury.
That something must be paid to him from the public treasury—whether you call it social security, insurance, or anything else—indicates that the human being qua human being possesses respect, and a minimum standard of life must be provided for him; these natural rights must be observed. This is that very inherent dignity.
Here lies a negative aspect and a positive aspect; “spend on him from the public treasury” is a governmental command, stating that they must pay him a sum from the public treasury. However, the Imam’s objection and his tone in objecting to this situation have nothing to do with government; he asks: why is it thus? Moral and human values are not restricted to government; that the Imam commanded to give him from the public treasury is a governmental command. It is shown that this is an ugly and uncommendable thing; this has no relation to being a ruler. Was the Imam’s objection to ugly things only when he was a ruler? Before his rule, whenever he witnessed such things, he would object to the caliphs; what were all those actions the Imam performed during those years to resolve these issues for, if he was not the ruler? The command to pay from the public treasury naturally relates to the government and when one has authority (mabsut al-yad); yet when he did not have authority, he paid from his own wealth and from those orchards he had cultivated around Kufah and Medina. “And infuse your heart with mercy for the subjects”—fill your heart with love for others. The end is important: “either a brother of yours in religion, or a peer of yours in creation”—they are either your brothers in religion or your peers in creation.
To be sure, we have traditions prohibiting certain matters in relation to disbelievers and people of innovation; we must resolve this conflict, which we shall discuss later; do not enter into that section at present. For example, do not initiate salutation to them… groups of these traditions conflict with these; we must resolve this conflict. If we resolve this conflict, the matter is concluded. At any rate, the sixth group usually consists of commands, recommendations, or the biography (sirah) that the Household (peace be upon them) had with the protected citizens. Although they were not believers or Muslims and were not considered brothers in faith, their respect was observed within these limits.
The Second Tradition
The second tradition: Masʿadah ibn Ṣadaqah narrates from Imam al-Sadiq (peace be upon him), and he from his fathers, that the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) accompanied a dhimmi man. The dhimmi asked the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him): Where are you going, O servant of Allah? The Imam stated: “I intend Kufah” (أُرِيدُ الْكُوفَةَ)—I am going toward Kufah. “Then when the path diverged for the dhimmi, the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) turned with him” (فَلَمَّا عَدَلَ الطَّرِيقُ بِالذِّمِّيِّ عَدَلَ مَعَهُ أَمِيرُ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ). When the path reached where the dhimmi wished to turn, the Imam accompanied him. Thereupon, the dhimmi asked: Did you not say you wished to go to Kufah? The Imam stated: Yes. The dhimmi said: Then why did you leave that path and accompany me? The Imam stated: I accompany you to complete the beauty of companionship, and the completion of good companionship is that when a man wishes to separate from his companion, he should escort him to some extent. Thereupon, the Imam stated: “And thus our Prophet (peace be upon him and his family) commanded us. The dhimmi said to him: Did he say thus? He said: Yes” (وَكَذَلِكَ أَمَرَنَا نَبِيُّنَا فَقَالَ لَهُ الذِّمِّيُّ هَكَذَا قَالَ قَالَ نَعَمْ). The dhimmi man asked: Is it truly so? The Imam stated: Yes. Thereafter, that dhimmi man accompanied the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) and became a Muslim.
Question:
Professor: The dhimmi man did not know the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him); thereafter, when he came, he recognized him.
The command of the Messenger of God (peace be upon him and his family) that the completion of good companionship is to escort the companion to some extent, and that, too, by way of honoring—what does this mean? We have many statements similar to this of the Messenger of God (peace be upon him and his family); the chain of transmission (sanad) of the tradition is also authentic and recorded in al-Kafi. Were it left to us, we would say it is obvious that it refers to companionship with a Muslim and a believer; were it not for this story wherein the Imam’s accompanying this dhimmi man is explicitly mentioned, we would say it is obvious that the command of the Messenger of God (peace be upon him and his family) relates only to the Muslim and the believer. But why did the Imam not restrict it to that?
Many of the ethical commands of our elders and Infallible Imams (peace be upon them) are of this kind. Unless there is an explicit prohibition, which, too, was made for specific reasons—for example, if they were prohibited from certain matters in relation to a group of people, such as interacting with the people of corruption and sin, which is clear, and even that is a restriction for the purpose of reforming them, or if, for example, a duty has been specifically designated toward brothers in faith—apart from these specific proofs, I believe that many of these commands are general. This is even so for those commands containing the word “brother,” “believer,” or “Muslim”; because we have witnessed examples in the biography of the Infallibles (peace be upon them) that these ethical and human treatments from them encompassed all human beings, and this very thing caused them to be attracted and accept Islam. Had it been otherwise, no one would have been attracted, and would not have easily renounced his prior beliefs.
Assuredly, Islam has a purpose and intent in this method; because the foundation of Islam’s program and roadmap for guiding the human being is that he reach salvation, which is performed on that very platform upon which God Himself created the human being—the platform of will, freedom, choice, and aversion to imposition. On this very platform, the prophets, the Noble Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him and his family), the Imams (peace be upon them), and religious leaders confronted human beings, and gradually attracted them toward Islam and religion; had it been otherwise, so many human beings would not have been attracted. If they had treated the disbelievers in a general sense—not a specific group—differently, no one would have become a Muslim.
I emphasize once again: as soon as we say a word, they say: “So what about Netanyahu?” I argue that this is a general rule and an absolute principle; however, if a human being departs from this path and becomes predatory, he is confronted with a set of punishments and deprivations. Quenching his primary needs—this is the principle. If it were otherwise, not only would no disbeliever be attracted to Islam, but it would also cause them to turn away.
The Seventh Group
The seventh group consists of traditions according to which certain behaviors of religions, nations, and religious minorities are recognized. Among these traditions is the chapter on marriage (nikah), stating: “For every nation there is a marriage.” We have many traditions containing this import. To explain “For every nation there is a marriage” (li-kulli qawmin nikah): the marriage of many nations and followers of creeds is invalid in our view and lacks the conditions of validity; however, if their marriage was performed based on the conditions accepted by themselves, it is recognized. On this basis, He does not permit falsely accusing them of unchastity (qadhf). Is there anything higher than the Zoroastrians, who believe in marriage with close kin (maharim)? Even regarding them, He stated: “For every nation there is a marriage,” and that the effects of marriage are also present there and must be recognized.
The First Tradition
The first tradition: Ibn Abī ʿUmayr narrates from Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ḥadhdhāʾ, who said: I was sitting with Imam al-Sadiq (peace be upon him). Someone who was sitting there asked: “What did your creditor do at last? ‘That is a son of a loose woman’ (ذَاكَ ابْنُ الْفَاعِلَةِ)—he is illegitimate.” He says: “When I said he is a son of a loose woman, Abū ʿAbdillāh (peace be upon him) looked at me with a severe look. I said: May I be your ransom! He is a Zoroastrian whose mother is his sister. He said: ‘Is that not marriage in their religion?'” (فَنَظَرَ إِلَيَّ أَبُو عَبْدِ اللَّهِ نَظَراً شَدِيداً قَالَ فَقُلْتُ جُعِلْتُ فِدَاكَ إِنَّهُ مَجُوسِيٌّ أُمُّهُ أُخْتُهُ فَقَالَ أَ وَ لَيْسَ ذَلِكَ فِي دِينِهِمْ نِكَاحاً).
This means you have no right to call him “son of a loose woman.” This severe treatment by the Imam shows that even matters that are unacceptable to us, rejected, and refuted, but because they are accepted by them and they believe in them, are recognized.
The Second Tradition
The second tradition: ʿAbdullāh ibn al-Ṣalt says: Khalil ibn Hāshim wrote to Dhu al-Riyāsatayn, who was the governor of Nishapur, saying: “A Zoroastrian man died and willed that a portion of his wealth be given to the poor. The judge of Nishapur took it and distributed it among the poor of the Muslims.” He asked Ma’mūn, but he said I do not know the answer to this: “I have nothing in this regard.” So he asked Abū al-Ḥasan [Imam al-Riḍā] (peace be upon him), and Abū al-Ḥasan (peace be upon him) said: “Indeed, the Zoroastrian did not make a will for the poor of the Muslims; rather, it is appropriate that the amount of that wealth be taken from the wealth of charity (sadaqah) and returned to the poor of the Zoroastrians” (إِنَّ الْمَجُوسِيَّ لَمْ يُوصِ لِفُقَرَاءِ الْمُسْلِمِينَ وَ لَكِنْ يَنْبَغِي أَنْ يُؤْخَذَ مِقْدَارُ ذَلِكَ الْمَالِ مِنْ مَالِ الصَّدَقَةِ فَيُرَدَّ عَلَى فُقَرَاءِ الْمَجُوسِ).
This Zoroastrian did not make a will for the poor of the Muslims; by what right did the judge do this? He had no right to give this to the poor of the Muslims. Therefore, the Imam stated: the amount of this wealth should be taken from the charity and given to the poor of the Zoroastrians in the amount he willed, so that his will is executed. How can this be justified? Is it other than that this human being has rights and respect that must be preserved?
The traditions indicating inherent dignity are very numerous; however, as indicated, we also have conflicting traditions that we must examine.
Discussion of the Next Session
We shall discuss the conflicting traditions and how to resolve the conflict in the next session.