Session Forty-Two, The Proofs of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being
Session Forty-Two
The Proofs of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being — The Second Proof: Traditions (Riwayāt) — The Conflicting Traditions — The First Group — The First, Second, and Third Traditions — Examining the First Group
May 17, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
Our discussion concerned the proofs of inherent dignity. We noted that several groups of traditions have been invoked to prove the inherent dignity of the human being in part, regardless of where the scope and domain of this dignity lie and what rights are established by virtue of this dignity—a matter we shall address later. Ten groups of traditions were mentioned. Regarding the last group, which we stated contains numerous traditions in Kitāb al-ʿIshrah in Wasāʾil al-Shīʿah and al-Kāfī, this is a vast chapter, and we can increase the number of these groups by mentioning some of these traditions independently; however, in outline, this measure is sufficient for the claim. The alignment of the argument with these traditions was also briefly explained, and it became clear that we have traditions by means of which we can prove that the human being possesses a boundary and sanctity, and that specific advantages have been granted to him by God—even though in contrast to these specific advantages, specific expectations and responsibilities are also directed toward the human being.
Conflicting Traditions
In contrast to these groups, we have traditions considered conflicting with these traditions, although these conflicting traditions themselves comprise different groups. Regarding the verses, we also addressed the conflicting verses; however, as far as I recall, we perhaps did not examine the conflicting verses one by one but rather gave a general answer. Regarding them, perhaps specific and more detailed answers can also be mentioned. At any rate, the conflicting traditions comprise several groups. As far as possible, I shall try to consolidate these groups so that their number does not become large, especially given the little time we have.
The First Group
One group of traditions indicates the denial of dignity to disbelievers, opponents, and certain human beings; that is, it is transmitted with the expression “no dignity/honor” (lā karāmata).
The First Tradition
The first tradition: “From Muṣaddiq ibn Ṣadaqah, from ʿAmmār ibn Mūsā, from Abū ʿAbdillāh (peace be upon him), that he was asked about a Christian man who is on travel accompanied by Muslims and dies. He said: A Muslim shall not wash him, and there is no dignity (lā karāmata), nor shall he bury him, nor stand over his grave, even if he were his father” (عَنْ مُصَدِّقِ بْنِ صَدَقَةَ عَنْ عَمَّارِ بْنِ مُوسَى عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ أَنَّهُ سُئِلَ عَنِ النَّصْرَانِيِّ يَكُونُ فِي السَّفَرِ وَ هُوَ مَعَ الْمُسْلِمِينَ فَيَمُوتُ قَالَ لَا يُغَسِّلُهُ مُسْلِمٌ وَ لَا كَرَامَةَ وَ لَا يَدْفِنُهُ وَ لَا يَقُومُ عَلَى قَبْرِهِ وَ إِنْ كَانَ أَبَاهُ). The question concerns a Christian person who was traveling accompanied by Muslims and passed away. The Imam (peace be upon him) stated: A Muslim shall not wash him, nor bury him, nor stand over his grave, even if that Christian person were his father. This tradition clearly indicates the absence of dignity for the disbeliever.
The Second Tradition
The second tradition: “From Ibn Muskān, from Ismāʿīl al-Juʿfī, who said: ‘I said to Abū Jaʿfar (peace be upon him): A man loves the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) but does not dissociate from his enemy, and says: He is more beloved to me than those who opposed him. He said: This is a confused person and he is an enemy; so do not pray behind him, and there is no dignity (lā karāmata), unless you must guard yourself against him (taqiyyah)'” (عَنِ ابْنِ مُسْكَانَ عَنْ إِسْمَاعِيلَ الْجُعْفِيِّ قَالَ قُلْتُ لِأَبِي جَعْفَرٍ رَجُلٌ يُحِبُّ أَمِيرَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ وَ لَا يَتَبَرَّأُ مِنْ عَدُوِّهِ وَ يَقُولُ هُوَ أَحَبُّ إِلَيَّ مِمَّنْ خَالَفَهُ فَقَالَ هَذَا مِخْلَطٌ وَ هُوَ عَدُوٌّ فَلَا تُصَلِّ خَلْفَهُ وَ لَا كَرَامَةَ إِلَّا أَنْ تَتَّقِيَهُ).
He says: I said to Imam al-Baqir (peace be upon him) that there is a man who loves the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) and is a lover of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him), but does not dissociate from his enemies and says: He is more beloved to me than those who opposed him. The Imam (peace be upon him) issues several commands and prohibitions and then states “and there is no dignity” (lā karāmata)—this person possesses no dignity.
The Third Tradition
The third tradition: This group of traditions shows that the disbeliever and certain classes of people, including the opponents, possess no dignity. Concerning the non-Shi’ah (al-ʿAmmah), he states: “By Allah, there is no dignity for them” (وَ اللَّهِ وَ لَا كَرَامَةَ لَهُمْ).
These traditions conflict with what we stated previously; we strived so much to argue that dignity is inherent and that all human beings enjoy a dignity, and we grounded this on several factors. Here, in this group of traditions, he explicitly denies dignity; this conflicts with those traditions. What must we do here?
Examining the First Group
First, we must see what has been denied in these traditions: is it the essence of dignity, or a degree or degrees of dignity? The diversity of individuals from whom dignity is denied in these traditions shows that “no dignity” (lā karāmata) in these cases is not directed at the essence of dignity. Those from whom dignity is denied include the opponents, the non-Shi’ah, the person who loves the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) but does not dissociate from his enemies (this is other than the non-Shi’ah, meaning he has guardianship (wilayah) but lacks dissociation (bara’ah)), and the Christian regarding whom the Imam stated: “there is no dignity for him.”
Concerning the one who refuses or prevents payment of alms (zakah), the expression is: “Whoever prevents a qirat of the alms of his wealth is neither a believer nor a Muslim, and there is no dignity (lā karāmata). O Ali! The one who abandons alms asks Allah to return to the world…” (مَنْ مَنَعَ قِيرَاطاً مِنْ زَكَاةِ مَالِهِ فَلَيْسَ بِمُؤْمِنٍ وَ لَا بِمُسْلِمٍ وَ لَا كَرَامَةَ يَا عَلِيُّ تَارِكُ الزَّكَاةِ يَسْأَلُ اللَّهَ الرَّجْعَةَ إِلَى الدُّنْيَا). It is clear that these people have no problem regarding religion, sect, and guardianship, yet they do not pay alms.
One group of them consists of those who are useful neither for their religion nor for their world: “In the testament of the Prophet (peace be upon him and his family) to Ali (peace be upon him), who said: ‘O Ali! Whoever you do not benefit from in his religion or his world, there is no good for you in sitting with him; and whoever does not make it obligatory upon himself toward you, do not make it obligatory upon yourself toward him, and there is no dignity (lā karāmata)'” (فِي وَصِيَّةِ النَّبِيِّ لِعَلِيٍّ قَالَ يَا عَلِيُّ مَنْ لَمْ تَنْتَفِعْ بِدِينِهِ وَ لَا دُنْيَاهُ فَلَا خَيْرَ لَكَ فِي مُجَالَسَتِهِ وَ مَنْ لَمْ يُوجِبْ لَكَ فَلَا تُوجِبْ لَهُ وَ لَا كَرَامَةَ). The Prophet (peace be upon him and his family), in a testament to Ali (peace be upon him), states: someone who is not a person of doing good, neither for the world nor for the hereafter, and is useful neither for your world nor for your hereafter, sitting with him has no benefit for you, and there is no dignity.
“From Muḥammad ibn Muslim, who said: ‘A man asked Abū ʿAbdillāh (peace be upon him) while I was sitting: Concerning a man who approached his maternal aunt during his youth, then desisted; does he marry her daughter? He said: No. I said: Indeed, he did not penetrate her, but it was something short of that. He said: He is not believed, and there is no dignity (lā karāmata)'” (عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ مُسْلِمٍ قَالَ سَأَلَ رَجُلٌ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ وَ أَنَا جَالِسٌ عَنْ رَجُلٍ نَالَ مِنْ خَالَتِهِ فِي شَبَابِهِ ثُمَّ ارْتَدَعَ يَتَزَوَّجُ ابْنَتَهَا قَالَ لَا قُلْتُ إِنَّهُ لَمْ يَكُنْ أَفْضَى إِلَيْهَا إِنَّمَا كَانَ شَيْءٌ دُونَ شَيْءٍ فَقَالَ لَا يُصَدَّقُ وَ لَا كَرَامَةَ). This relates to marriage under specific conditions; someone had done something and asks if he may marry her daughter? He said: He is not believed, and there is no dignity.
“I asked him concerning the divorce of a drunkard. He said: It is not permissible, and there is no dignity (lā karāmata)” (سَأَلْتُهُ عَنْ طَلَاقِ السَّكْرَانِ فَقَالَ لَا يَجُوزُ وَ لَا كَرَامَةَ). The divorce of someone who is drunk is not permissible. Then he states: there is no dignity. This expression is also used regarding mutual imprecation (lian).
This expression also appears regarding some jurists: “As for him who among the jurists protects his soul, preserves his religion, opposes his whim, and is obedient to the command of his Master, the laypeople may emulate him. And that is not the case except for some of the jurists of the Shi’ah, not all of them; for whoever among them commits ugly deeds and immoralities in the manner of the scholars of the non-Shi’ah, do not accept anything from them on our authority, and there is no dignity (lā karāmata)” (فَأَمَّا مَنْ كَانَ مِنَ الْفُقَهَاءِ صَائِناً لِنَفْسِهِ حَافِظاً لِدِينِهِ مُخَالِفاً عَلَى هَوَاهُ مُطِيعاً لِأَمْرِ مَوْلَاهُ فَلِلْعَوَامِّ أَنْ يُقَلِّدُوهُ وَ ذَلِكَ لَا يَكُونُ إِلَّا بَعْضَ فُقَهَاءِ الشِّيعَةِ لَا كُلَّهُمْ فَإِنَّ مَنْ رَكِبَ مِنَ الْقَبَائِحِ وَ الْفَوَاحِشِ مَرَاكِبَ عُلَمَاءِ الْعَامَّةِ فَلَا تَقْبَلُوا مِنْهُمْ عَنَّا شَيْئاً وَ لَا كَرَامَةَ).
Another tradition relates to a man who falsely accused his wife of unchastity (qadhf): “From Muḥammad ibn Muslim, who said: ‘I asked him concerning the man who accuses his wife of unchastity. He said: He is scourged. I said: What if she pardons him? He said: No, and there is no dignity (lā karāmata)'” (عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ مُسْلِمٍ قَالَ سَأَلْتُهُ عَنِ الرَّجُلِ يَقْذِفُ امْرَأَتَهُ قَالَ يُجْلَدُ قُلْتُ أَ رَأَيْتَ إِنْ عَفَتْ عَنْهُ قَالَ لَا وَ لَا كَرَامَةَ).
According to these traditions we have quoted, there are seven or eight groups and classes of people concerning whom, by virtue of the actions they performed, the Infallibles (peace be upon them) spoke with this expression. For example, in this last case where he says: “if she pardons him, he said: No,” even if the wife pardons the man who accused her, he still states that this is ineffective, and there is no dignity; this is directed at the person. In some of these traditions, the expression “no dignity” (lā karāmata) has no relation to that dignity under our discussion. Sometimes it is directed at the action and deed performed—meaning it wishes to say their action has no value. Sometimes it is directed at the person; yet even if it is directed at the person, what is meant is the denial of a degree of dignity, rather than the essence of dignity.
Regarding the Shi’ah who performed mutual imprecation, the Shi’ah who was drunk and divorced his wife, the Shi’ah who did not pay alms, and the Shi’ah with whom sitting has no good for one’s world and hereafter—concerning all of these, it is stated: “there is no dignity.” But does it deny dignity entirely (bi-l-marrah) here? Does it deny dignity altogether, or does it deny a degree of dignity? Our contention is that the dignity we proved through the ten groups of traditions is other than this dignity.
The only traditions that can, in some manner, conflict with the dignity under our discussion are the expression used concerning a Christian and that concerning the non-Shi’ah. Among all these traditions we mentioned, you observed that most of them do not relate to our subject of discussion; therefore, as I noted, the expression “no dignity” in them has no relation to the discussion. That is, that former dignity is established within one domain, whereas this latter dignity is denied within another domain, differing in the meaning of degree and being fundamentally different.
Question:
Professor: This is like: “There is no prayer for the neighbor of the mosque except in the mosque” (لَا صَلَاةَ لِجَارِ الْمَسْجِدِ إِلَّا فِي الْمَسْجِدِ); it does not mean he does not possess the reality of prayer. Because prior to it, He says… “Whoever prevents a qirat of the alms of his wealth is neither a believer nor a Muslim, and there is no dignity” (مَنْ مَنَعَ قِيرَاطاً مِنْ زَكَاةِ مَالِهِ فَلَيْسَ بِمُؤْمِنٍ وَ لَا بِمُسْلِمٍ وَ لَا كَرَامَةَ). “No dignity,” by the contextual clue of “neither a believer nor a Muslim,” is not directed at the essence of dignity.
Another is the tradition related to the Christian who dies on travel. Concerning him, the Imam’s expression is: “A Muslim shall not wash him, and there is no dignity, nor shall he bury him, nor stand over his grave” (لَا يُغَسِّلُهُ مُسْلِمٌ وَ لَا كَرَامَةَ وَ لَا يَدْفِنُهُ وَ لَا يَقُومُ عَلَى قَبْرِهِ). A Muslim shall not wash him—he does not say leave him to decay; he says a Muslim shall not bury him, nor stand over his grave, even if he were his father. In reality, these commands are to make known the difference between a Muslim and a non-Muslim in certain rites; the rites established for burying a Muslim are certainly specific rites.
We previously noted that for God, Blessed and Exalted is He, to establish privileges for Muslims (for reasons that must be explained in their proper place) does not mean the denial of dignity to others. It is possible that all human beings are equal in a class of privileges and rights, yet specific privileges are also designated for Muslims; this is not problematic at all. You might ask about this very point as to why privileges have been designated for Muslims and followers of the school of the Household (peace be upon them); yes, this is a question that must be answered in another context as to why these privileges have been established. However, the existence of these privileges is not proof of the absence of inherent dignity for the human being, just as certain penalties and punishments toward some human beings, disbelievers, and criminals are not proof of the denial of inherent dignity.
Therefore, what is denied in this tradition in relation to the Christian is the denial of a class of specific respects for Muslims—meaning those specific respects you must perform for Muslims, that specific respect necessary for a deceased Muslim, are not necessary; however, he has not said throw him away, nor has he said do not bury him; he has said do not stand over his grave.
Question:
Professor: That is another discussion; we wish to see: does this indicate the absence of inherent dignity? No. That he states a Muslim shall not bury him, a Muslim shall not wash him, and a Muslim shall not stand over his grave—the denial of specific respect and specific ennoblement related to the deceased among Muslims has no contradiction with the existence of inherent dignity. We never claim that they are equal and identical in everything; here lie two discussions: first, that they possess no respect, sanctity, or right whatsoever; and second, that in addition to all human beings sharing in certain rights and privileges, specific privileges are designated for Muslims and groups of Muslims—just as in a classroom, the teacher and principal provide facilities for everyone, yet at the same time designate specific prizes for some students who strive more toward the objectives of the principal or teacher.
Question:
Professor: The essence of dignity is clear, because it is unique to the human being… if it is by virtue of these matters, there is no difference between the Muslim and the non-Muslim.
Concerning the non-Shi’ah, this expression has been transmitted: “From Abū ʿAbdillāh (peace be upon him), who said: ‘It does not harm him who is upon our guardianship and our love that he has nothing to shade himself with except the trees, and eats nothing except their leaves. The people went right and left, and you cleaved to us.’ Someone present said: ‘May I be your ransom! Indeed, we hope that Allah will not make us and them equal’—meaning the non-Shi’ah” (عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ أَنَّهُ قَالَ مَا يَضُرُّ مَنْ كَانَ عَلَى وَلَايَتِنَا وَ مَحَبَّتِنَا أَنْ لَا يَكُونَ لَهُ مَا يَسْتَظِلُّ بِهِ إِلَّا الشَّجَرُ وَ لَا يَأْكُلُ إِلَّا مِنْ وَرَقِهَا أَخَذَ النَّاسُ يَمِيناً وَ شِمَالًا وَ لَزِمْتُمُونَا فَقَالَ بَعْضُ مَنْ حَضَرَهُ جُعِلْتُ فِدَاكَ إِنَّا لَنَرْجُو أَنْ لَا يُسَوِّيَنَا اللَّهُ وَ هَؤُلَاءِ). We hope He will not view us and them in the same manner, as equal, since we are thus toward you. This statement is important: “He said: ‘No, by Allah, there is no dignity for them’ (قَالَ لَا وَ اللَّهِ وَ لَا كَرَامَةَ لَهُمْ).
Here, it is true that he used the expression “there is no dignity for them,” but this is in comparison to the followers of the Household (peace be upon them)—meaning the denial of dignity is not absolute, but relative. What this person himself said is a contextual clue that what is meant is the denial of a degree of dignity, rather than the denial of dignity altogether (ra’san) and entirely. He says we hope they will not be on the same level with us; the Imam states: No, they possess no value and dignity. They possess no dignity—meaning in comparison to you, not absolutely. This is basically not in the context of expressing the existence and non-existence of dignity, let alone inherent dignity. Therefore, none of the traditions in which dignity is explicitly denied are considered conflicting with those traditions, because they deny degrees of dignity and are not directed at inherent dignity—whereas our discussion and the subject of the traditions we mentioned is the essence of dignity and the existence of dignity in all human beings. Thus, it appears that these traditions are not considered conflicting.
Question:
Professor: Within those very traditions that are positive and have been invoked by the claimant, weak traditions exist; here, too, weak traditions exist. However, in both groups, good and reliable traditions also exist. Assuming we descend from the issue of the chain of transmission, we provide this answer from the perspective of implication.
Discussion of the Next Session
We shall discuss the second group of conflicting traditions and how to resolve the conflict in the next session, God willing.