Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi in an Interview with Harim-e Imam Journal: The Standing of Art in Islamic Jurisprudence
To begin, please explain: what is the meaning of Islamic art?
Before offering a depiction of Islamic art, it is necessary to point out that although art has always cast its shadow over human life and accompanied mankind since prehistoric times, it remains one of the mysteries of human cultural life. For this reason, presenting a comprehensive definition for it is difficult. Undoubtedly, the breadth and diversity of art’s presence in different dimensions of life, as well as its evolution across various epochs and regions, and the differing positions of divine and materialistic religions and schools of thought in confronting art, have made this task challenging. On this basis, if we say that the essence of art remains an ambiguous phenomenon in today’s world, we have not spoken in exaggeration. The evidence for this claim is the lack of coherence and harmony in the definitions proposed for art.
With this point in mind, if we wish to define Islamic art, it is obvious that it will not be an easy task. When the concept of art itself is plagued by such dispersion, naturally, the meaning of Islamic art also becomes complex. Hence, you see that various definitions of Islamic art have been proposed. For example, some consider Islamic art to be the art of Islamic lands during the Islamic era. According to this definition, the art formed in Islamic lands until the end of the twentieth century is deemed Islamic art, even if it was presented by non-Muslims and, in some instances, is incompatible with the teachings of Islam. This view is mostly prevalent among Orientalists. It is clear that this definition possesses serious defects.
Some have modified this definition, stating that Islamic art means the art of Muslims; art that is necessarily presented by Muslims. Based on this definition, although the scope of Islamic art is more restricted than the previous definition, it still possesses a broad range and includes any art presented by anyone recognized as a Muslim! This is while the label “Muslim” is applied to anyone who has embraced Islam, regardless of their beliefs and behavior. It appears that this definition is also incomplete and suffers from multiple defects.
Another definition, which is somewhat more complete than the previous two, is that Islamic art is art that transmits divine and Islamic themes. According to this definition, if art is in the service of Islamic teachings and directed toward guiding the people, it can be considered Islamic. Of course, what constitutes the teachings of Islam and what achieves the guidance of the people are themselves subjects of debate and disagreement. Diverse understandings of Islam have led to differing perspectives on art. For example, the perspective Al-Ghazali had toward art and the perspective Imam Khomeini (may his soul be sanctified) had toward art are two completely different views. From the perspective of Imam Khomeini (may his soul be sanctified), Islamic art is the depiction of the path of justice, honor, and fairness, and the embodiment of the bitter suffering of those starved and oppressed by power and wealth. In his view, Islamic art illustrates the blind spots, ambiguities, and social, economic, political, and military dilemmas; it is a beautiful and pure art that strikes modern capitalism and bloodthirsty communism. Certainly, moral virtues, honor, and fairness are part of the teachings of Islam, and their manifestation in art is necessary, but in his view, this alone is not sufficient.
In any case, diverse and sometimes contrasting views regarding Islamic art exist. Among all these definitions, it seems better to define Islamic art with respect to its content; meaning that if art involves the transmission of pure Islamic themes along with a comprehensive and complete understanding of Islam derived from the Quran and Sunnah, expresses moral virtues and human perfections, steers humanity toward absolute perfection and absolute good, and distances them from the tyrant (Taghut), then it can be considered Islamic art.
Islamic art is certainly built upon certain principles; if possible, please explain its foundations.
It must be noted that the place to explain the foundations of Islamic art is not here in jurisprudential discussions; rather, it must be investigated in the science of theology (kalam), as these foundations are derived from Islamic cosmology and anthropology. Nevertheless, several important points can be mentioned briefly in this regard:
The most important point is that, in a way, art can be considered an innate (fitri) matter; because on one hand, there is a connection between art and beauty, and on the other hand, human beings innately love beauty. Since religious teachings are compatible with human nature (fitrah), Islam certainly recognizes art, and its foundation must be in harmony with human nature.
Another point is that in the epistemic framework of Islam, the human being and leading them to true perfection and growth hold a special status. On this basis, art must proceed along the path of human perfection and growth, whereas in non-religious art—and particularly in modern art—this matter is fundamentally ignored. What is important in modern art is attention to human desires and the satisfaction of instincts, even if these desires are sensual and material. Avicenna states in his book Al-Isharat (The Book of Remarks and Admonitions): “The benefit of art is that it transforms the commanding self (al-nafs al-ammarah) into the reassured self (al-nafs al-mutma’innah), and causes human imaginative and illusory power to be steered toward sacred imaginations and to emerge from sensual illusions.”
On this basis, art that leads to lust-seeking and the satisfaction of animalistic instincts is rejected from the perspective of Islam.
Another foundation is the necessity of human attention to God and the purposefulness of the universe. In the logic of Islam, attention to the center of the universe—namely the Essence of the Lord—is a principle, and negligence of it is not commendable. Islamic art is an art that strives to draw the attention of its audience to this crucial matter and to transition them from all creations of this world and the outward appearance of things to the inward dimensions of the universe, the realities of affairs, and their Creator.
Other foundations can also be mentioned for Islamic art, which must be investigated in their proper place, but briefly, it must be noted that these foundations bring us into conflict with many manifestations of modern and contemporary art.
In your opinion, what is the standing of art in Islamic jurisprudence?
Considering the meaning that has been explained, art certainly occupies an elevated standing in Islamic jurisprudence. If we view art as a method and state that art is a specific method for expressing truths built upon the element of imagination, then given that in Islamic art, the truths to be explained are the lofty themes of pure Islam, employing this method is not only recommended (mustahabb) but obligatory (wajib). There is no doubt that utilizing such a tool to transmit sublime religious and Islamic concepts cannot be neglected in jurisprudence, which is responsible for explaining the duties of religious individuals and the public. This is a general perspective.
Therefore, at times we wish to examine the standing of art, in the sense explained, in Islamic jurisprudence, and its status is clear. However, attention must also be paid to this point: is the transmission of sublime religious and Islamic themes permissible through any method? It is true that the domain of Islamic art, according to the definition provided, is a content-oriented domain, but it has certain limitations in terms of form. For instance, if someone wishes to transmit a value-based or moral concept to society using one of the manifestations of modern art that definitely contradicts Islamic rulings, is it permissible? Jurisprudence certainly does not permit the use of a definitively prohibited (haram) method, even for transmitting a sacred and sublime concept.
At other times, we wish to know the standing of art in its general sense in Islamic jurisprudence. In this case, the matter is different. Art in its general sense means art without a religious and moral approach and content, particularly in the modern era, where the distinct characteristic of art is “art for art’s sake” rather than for religious, moral, and human objectives. Obviously, jurisprudence has an issue with this art; because in this art, attention is primarily focused on human pleasure and sensory beauty, and in the words of some Western scholars, this beauty and pleasure must be disinterested and free from specific interests. For this reason, many of them believe that the artistic work must free itself from any moral or religious purpose and orientation. It is clear that such a view of art is in serious conflict with jurisprudence, and indeed with the epistemic system of Islam; because moral and religious purposefulness, as well as Sharia discipline, are necessary in every human behavior, while in the theory of “art for art’s sake,” no limitations exist in this regard.
What is the relationship between jurisprudence (fiqh) and art?
In general, jurisprudence is a science responsible for determining the religious duties of human individuals in various dimensions of individual, family, and social life, and delineating human obligations in different events and situations. Obviously, a science with such a function cannot remain indifferent and neutral toward art, which is one of the important dimensions of human life. For this reason, Islamic jurisprudence—neither during the era of the Infallibles (peace be upon them) nor during the Era of Occultation—has ever been neutral or without a stance toward this aspect of human life.
By reviewing the narrations transmitted from the Infallibles (peace be upon them) and by referring to the books of the grand jurists, one can easily infer the positive or negative stance of jurisprudence toward many artistic manifestations. Of course, the word “art” specifically does not appear in the Quran or narrations, but many instances of art prevalent during that era have been mentioned, such as sculpting, depiction, singing (ghina), music, and dance.
Now, what stance was adopted in confronting these matters, what opinions were expressed, and what was the basis of these opinions, is another subject. Gradually, with the developments and evolutions that occurred in the field of art, new discussions took shape in jurisprudence. For example, when the issue of photography emerged as a new phenomenon, the debate arose as to whether taking pictures is permissible or not, as the drawing of human images had previously been discussed as prohibited. Then, with the entry of this phenomenon, this issue was examined from another angle, namely that although this image is the image of a human, because no one “created” it, there is no objection to it. Some decrees in this regard stemmed from the specific view directed toward this issue, whereas if the narrations on depiction—encompassing both animate (dhi ruh) and inanimate—had been reflected upon differently, the matter would have proceeded differently.
In short, as we proceed, specific methods and techniques appear in this field, fundamentally altering the nature of art compared to what was discussed in the past. In this environment, some believe that a general perspective toward the category of art must take shape in jurisprudence. They say: “We do not witness a general stance toward art as a concept in the domain of jurisprudence.” However, this statement is ambiguous. If the meaning of a general stance toward art is that the rules and principles associated with this category should be compiled and a chapter opened under this title in jurisprudence—which, like other jurisprudential chapters and alongside them, contains the rulings and rules associated with all common artistic categories—then it is a correct statement. But if the meaning is that instead of addressing the manifestations of art that are gradually emerging, we should move toward designing a single abstract structure, I must say that this expectation of jurisprudence is not correct.
Another point that must be considered is that the various subjects in the category of art must be properly understood. Sometimes, one observes incomplete and incorrect conceptions of artistic subjects taking shape in the minds of seminary students and scholars, which is unfavorable and causes surprise and dissatisfaction among artists. It is true that the duty of the jurist is to deduce the ruling (hukm), but for a correct deduction, he must understand the subject (mawdu’) in a correct manner. Of course, understanding a subject does not mean that he must become an expert in that field, but merely familiarity with the boundaries and limits of the subject through reliable means is sufficient.
In any case, there is a wide gap between what is and what ought to be. Of course, works are underway, and recently a conference was held in this regard, but as the Supreme Leader stated, more work must be done in this field.
What is the role of jurisprudence in the progress and decline of art?
Which art is meant by progress and decline, and what is intended by progress and decline? If the intended art refers to the manifestations prevalent in modern art and the Western world, since in jurisprudence—and generally in the epistemic system of Islam—emphasis is placed on the purposefulness and value-oriented nature of art, naturally certain limitations are created. For example, in Islamic jurisprudence, the nudity of men and women is unacceptable, whereas in some branches of modern and contemporary art, this is considered an inseparable part. This view is even supported by some philosophical foundations; for instance, they say: nudity is actually showing humanity in conditions prior to the Fall, and this action is praised by gnostics and deep thinkers because it reflects the primary state of man.
Matters such as singing and dancing of women, specific relations between men and women in contemporary cinema, etc., are matters toward which Islamic jurisprudence definitely holds a negative stance. Therefore, from this perspective and from the view of the proponents of these arts, decline is involved.
However, if the intended art is the opposite of this view, Islamic jurisprudence, considering what has been discussed, will certainly lead to the elevation and growth of art and bring it to its authentic standing. Of course, attention to this point is also necessary: when we say “Islamic jurisprudence,” it must be properly specified which jurisprudence and which jurist is intended; because according to some understandings, limitations may be created even for this sublime art, as this has indeed occurred and unfortunately confronted religion with a dead end in the contemporary world, causing difficulties for religious individuals.
How do you evaluate the influence of time and space in deducing rulings related to art?
This issue is dependent on the general discussion of the influence of time and space in deduction and independent reasoning (ijtihad), and the manner of interpreting this influence is highly important. In general, there are differing understandings of the effect of time and space in ijtihad, which was raised by Imam Khomeini (may his soul be sanctified), and indeed some interpretations and understandings are fundamentally incompatible with what Imam Khomeini stated, which is not the place for this discussion.
For example, one understanding is that we should deduce rulings based on conventional foundations and methods in jurisprudence, and should a conflict (tazahum) arise based on the conditions of time and space, those conflicts are considered, and the execution of the important ruling is temporarily suspended in favor of the more important (al-ahamm). This meaning is not what was intended by Imam Khomeini, because it relates to a stage posterior to ijtihad. Or, for instance, someone might assume that the influence of time and space in ijtihad means that if the subject changes, the ruling also changes. This is also a matter to which everyone is committed and is not a new issue for Imam Khomeini to have expressed.
In any case, if we accept the major premise of the influence of time and space in ijtihad, it can certainly be applied to art as well, and will bring about remarkable effects.
How do you analyze the prohibition of arts such as sculpting, music, and the like, and the transformation of their rulings in our day?
It must be noted that this change is not the opinion of all jurists; for example, regarding sculpting, many still believe that making a complete sculpture of a being possessing a soul is not permissible; or regarding music, many consider it absolutely prohibited. At the same time, the basis for the permissibility of these matters according to some jurists relates to their manner of utilizing the evidences.
For instance, regarding music, if a jurist infers from the evidences that what is prohibited in the narrations is music suitable for gatherings of vain amusement and play (lahw wa la’ib), then other types of music are deemed permissible, and the buying and selling of its instruments will not be prohibited either, as they would be considered dual-purpose instruments (alat-e mushtarakah). According to this view, if music is prohibited, it is due to the consequence of corruption associated with it, and if it does not lead to corruption, it is not prohibited. When the criterion of prohibition is the occurrence of corruption, naturally, the ruling of prohibition is not applied where the criterion is absent. Thus, the issue returns to the comprehension of the texts (nusus).
Or regarding sculpting and depiction, if someone believes that the prohibition of sculpting was to counter idol-making, then making sculptures outside of this assumption will be legitimate in their view.
Some believe that referring the problem of art to jurisprudence is a futile matter. What is your opinion?
This statement can have several origins. If the meaning is that a portion of the problem of art, instead of jurisprudence, must be examined in the philosophy of art, this statement is accepted in part (fi al-jumlah), not in whole (bi-al-jumlah).
If the meaning is that referring art to jurisprudence with its current structure is futile, this statement is both correct and incorrect. If the meaning is that the current structure of jurisprudence cannot respond to any of the issues of art, it is incorrect; and if the meaning is that with the current structure, a portion of the problem of art cannot be resolved, it is correct.
If the meaning is that generally, the domain of art is a conventional (urfi) domain and there is no need for the presence of jurisprudence in this field, this statement is definitely false. This is because, as mentioned, art, as one of the most important tools for transmitting concepts and one of the phenomena of this universe, must be presented to jurisprudence so that the ruling of its various manifestations is clarified. We stated that jurisprudence never holds a neutral stance toward this category or other categories of human life, and therefore, the duties of individuals toward its different fields must be made clear.
In your opinion, why is it necessary for the seminary and professors to pay closer attention to the jurisprudence of art?
This necessity becomes apparent in light of three points:
The first point: Today, art is one of the most extensive dimensions of human life; because it has had an effective and prominent presence in all domains of human life and possesses various roles and functions in different fields. It has both intrinsic functions and instrumental functions. The most fundamental intrinsic function of art is the refinement of the soul. The most important instrumental function of art is that it can bear sublime moral, religious, and human concepts in a manner that is irreplaceable; meaning there is no other way to transmit them except through art, and in the words of the Supreme Leader, an idea that is not cast in the mold of art is not enduring.
The second point: The inherent duty of the Islamic seminaries and their noble professors is to guide and steer the members of society toward human perfections and place them on the path of growth and evolution. The duty and responsibility of the clergy and the seminaries are the very same duty and responsibility of the divine prophets. All the effort of the seminary is focused on educating humans, guiding them toward the straight path, and preventing them from the path of error and misguidance.
The third point: Satans and the banner-bearers of disbelief, hypocrisy, and falsehood, both in the past and present, have utilized and continue to utilize the tool of art to the utmost to advance their objectives. They have used all these methods and tools to create intellectual and moral deviation among youth in all corners of the world, and in many cases, they have succeeded.
Considering these three points, it is obvious that the seminary must pay greater attention to the category of art than before, and particularly perform effective action in the field of the jurisprudence of art. Of course, to realize this objective, certain preliminaries are necessary, which must be implemented by preparing them and training specialized personnel in this field.