Preliminaries, Sixth Preliminary: The Domains of Application of the Practical Principles
Session Six
Preliminaries, Sixth Preliminary: The Domains of Application of the Practical Principles, The Discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani, The First, Second, and Third Objections and Their Analysis, The Discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei
September 21, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
The sixth preliminary concerned the domains of application (majari) of the practical principles. We noted that legal theorists have outlined various domains for these principles. Three formulations proposed by Sheikh al-Ansari were discussed in the previous session. The late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani raised several objections against these formulations, at least three of which deserve mention here.
The first objection was that both the first and second formulations are contradicted by cases where one doubts between the obligation of one thing and the prohibition of another. According to the first and second formulations of the late Sheikh, this should be the domain of exemption (bara’ah), because both situations involve doubt regarding the obligation itself (al-shakk fi-l-taklif).
In the first formulation, exemption is bound by two conditions: that the doubt is in the obligation itself, and that precaution is possible. In the second formulation, however, there is only one condition, namely, that the doubt is in the obligation itself, regardless of whether precaution is possible or not.
The problem is that the late Sheikh himself applies precaution (ihtiyat) in these cases. While according to the first and second formulations, exemption should be applied, the late Sheikh and other scholars actually apply precaution here.
The Second Objection
The second objection (which applies to both the first and third formulations) also constitutes a counter-example. For instance, if the doubt is between obligation, prohibition, and permissibility (ibahah), according to the first formulation, choice (takhyir) applies where precaution is not possible. In the third formulation, choice also applies where precaution is not possible (regardless of whether it is a doubt in the obligation itself or in the object of obligation).
Since precaution is not possible here, it should be the domain of choice. Yet, in reality, this is the domain of exemption (bara’ah). Doubt between obligation, prohibition, or permissibility actually concerns the essence of the obligation itself, and therefore, exemption (bara’ah) must be applied. Nonetheless, according to the first and third formulations, it would be the domain of choice.
The Third Objection
The late Akhund [al-Khurasani] also raised a specific objection against the third formulation, which is a counter-example targeting the Sheikh. For example, if we doubt whether a certain action is obligatory or prohibited, according to the third formulation, this is the domain of exemption (bara’ah), because it is a doubt regarding the obligation itself; we possess no evidence for either obligation or prohibition. Rationally, this should be the place of exemption. Yet, in the conflict between two incompatible alternatives (al-dawaran bayna al-mahzurayn), everyone has argued for choice (takhyir).
Therefore, the objections raised against these three formulations have prompted scholars to seek a remedy and propose alternative domains.
We previously stated that these three formulations differ significantly and yield distinct implications. Although they may share common ground on certain axes, there is undoubtedly a difference in their outcomes, some of which were highlighted within these objections. We will not linger further on this matter.
The Discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei
The late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei states: sometimes we attain direct certainty (‘ilm-e-wujdani) and personal conviction regarding a divine ruling, and sometimes we do not attain direct certainty, but rather legal/devotional certainty (‘ilm-e-ta’abbudi). If we attain direct certainty, its authority (hujjiyyah) is self-evident, requires no further discussion, and is unrelated to the practical principles.
However, at other times we do not attain direct certainty, but rather legal/devotional certainty is established for us. By “devotional certainty,” it is meant that although a possibility of contradiction exists in reality, it is legally treated as equivalent to certainty. We are instructed to accept it as certainty. Presumptive proofs (amarat) and specific conjectures (zunun khassah) all generate devotional certainty. Unlike absolute certainty (qat’), they do not entirely preclude the possibility of contradiction; however, the Lawgiver has discarded that possibility of contradiction in these cases, just as rational people do. Therefore, they are recognized as equivalent to certainty and its substitute—or in his terms, “devotional certainty.” We are not concerned with this aspect either; that is, neither the first nor the second category. The major discussions of the science of Usul belong to this second category.
Sometimes we do not attain direct or devotional certainty at all; meaning we acquire neither absolute certainty (qat’) nor a conjecture whose validity has been established by evidence. Instead, doubt (shakk) arises for us.
He then states: if we do not attain direct or devotional certainty, our duty is determined sometimes by rational practical principles and at other times by textual (Shar’i) practical principles. Those rules which, in the context of doubt regarding the actual ruling, are derived from the sacred law, establish an apparent ruling (hukm zahiri) for us and define our practical duty in their respective instances. The evidence that points to the apparent ruling derived from those proofs is known as “jurisprudential proof” (dalil fiqahati), in contrast to “deductive/ijtihadi proof” (dalil ijtihadi).
Thus, he states that textual principles define an apparent ruling and a practical duty for us in instances of doubt. In some situations where we doubt the ruling of something, our intellect directs us toward a practical duty. In this case, an apparent ruling is not established; rather, the intellect independently dictates exemption in some cases, precaution in others, and choice in others.
Regarding the specific domains in which these rational and textual practical principles are established, he states: the doubt either possesses a previous state and the Lawgiver has validated it, or it lacks a previous state, or even if it does, the Lawgiver has not validated it (meaning either no previous state exists at all, or a previous state exists but is not validated). If it has a previous state and the Lawgiver has validated it, this is the domain of the presumption of continuity (istishab), regardless of whether it is a doubt in the obligation itself or in the object of obligation, and whether precaution is possible or not.
However, where the previous state is not considered (whether because it does not exist or because it is not considered), if the doubt is in the essence of the obligation itself (al-shakk fi asl al-taklif), this is the domain of exemption (bara’ah). If the doubt is in the object of obligation (al-shakk fi-l-mukallaf bih)—meaning that the essence of the obligation is known but the specific object is unknown—two scenarios arise: either precaution is possible, which is the domain of the rule of occupancy (qa’idat al-ishtighal), or precaution is not possible, which is the domain of choice (takhyir).
Now, with which of the late Sheikh’s three formulations does this view align? The first, second, or third?
We have outlined the view of the late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei alongside the three formulations of the late Sheikh. This is identical to the Sheikh’s second formulation. If that is the case, then the same objections that applied to the late Sheikh’s second formulation also apply to this framework—whether shared with the first formulation, the third formulation, or representing a specific objection targeting this structure. Naturally, this framework is also untenable.
Critique of the Discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei
Furthermore, the primary issues with what the late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei has proposed consist of two points.
The first issue is that the late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei has spoken of the “apparent ruling” (hukm zahiri). He asserts that textual practical principles indicate an apparent ruling. His phrasing is as follows: “The fourth category: that which does not lead us to the actual ruling through direct certainty or religious devotion, but rather investigates the rules responsible for clarifying apparent rulings in the context of doubt regarding the actual ruling; these rules are called textual practical principles.”
He explicitly asserts (like many legal theorists) that textual practical principles clarify the apparent ruling. Of course, regarding rational practical principles, he states: they do not clarify an apparent ruling, but merely define a practical duty. This is his phrasing: “The fifth category: that which investigates the rules responsible for determining the actual duty rationally when one is unable to apply any of the preceding. For when the duty-bound person does not reach the actual ruling through direct certainty or religious devotion, and is also unable to apply the apparent ruling, they must return to what the intellect independently dictates of exemption, precaution, or choice, depending on the context.” These are termed rational practical principles. Regarding rational practical principles, he states that we cannot discover an apparent ruling, unlike the textual practical principles.
The other problem is a fundamental, premise-based objection (ishkal mabna’i): namely, that fundamentally, there is no such thing as an apparent ruling (hukm zahiri), as this is a subject of dispute and debate. In our discussions on the nature of rulings (mabahith al-hukm) which we addressed in the early years of this course, we rejected the fundamental existence of apparent rulings. We stated that we do not possess anything called an apparent ruling. We rejected the idea that Almighty God has two distinct acts of legislation (ja’l), and that a separate legislation independent of the actual ruling is designated for the apparent ruling. We stated that when a ruling is not discovered, the intellect simply looks at what duty lies upon the duty-bound. However, they do not accept this as a formal law or a divine ruling.
The issue of the apparent ruling is a point of contention, and we have rejected it. If the fundamental existence of the apparent ruling is denied, many subsequent discussions change. For instance, one of the relatively long discussions we previously addressed was, based on this premise, the reconciliation between actual and apparent rulings (al-jam’ bayna al-hukm al-waqi’i wa-l-zahiri). Reconciling the two is predicated upon the existence of both an actual ruling and an apparent ruling. However, if one asserts that we have only one ruling—which we sometimes access and sometimes do not—then stating that we have an apparent ruling here which is also legislated is incorrect.
Therefore, the first objection to the discourse of the late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei is his commitment to the existence of the apparent ruling, while its very essence is rejected. Naturally, with these explanations, this becomes a fundamental objection.
The second objection targeting his view is his division of certainty into actual/direct certainty and devotional certainty. We do not possess anything that can be called “devotional certainty” (‘ilm-e-ta’abbudi), because the legal assimilation (tanzil) of certain matters to the status of certainty does not occur. We do not have such a thing as two categories of certainty and conviction: one being certain and the other devotional, or one being intuitive and the other devotional. If the intention is that it is legally assimilated to the status of certainty, this itself is subject to discussion.
Objection: The phrase “until you know” (ma lam ta’lam) encompasses this as well, and this constitutes certainty; meaning that authoritative testimony (bayyinah) is equivalent to certainty.
Professor: There is no dispute that authoritative testimony is valid in thematic matters (mawdū’āt). If we wish to include it under the scope of “until you know,” we must state that what is meant by certainty (‘ilm) is not absolute certainty and conviction, but rather knowledge or a rational proof; something backed by rational evidence. … They are not necessarily so… Is certainty used here figuratively to mean certainty, or is it legally assimilated to the status of certainty? The late Na’ini and those of his school asserted this and derived this conclusion. However, in reality, this is not the case. When we say “certainty” (‘ilm), it is obvious that it means conviction. The Lawgiver has not intervened to say, “I have legislated another type of certainty for you and validated it.” No, and this is not the case in custom (‘urf) either. No one refers to a valid conjectural proof as “certainty” (‘ilm).
The late Imam [Khomeini] (may Allah have mercy on him) has also proposed a domain for the practical principles, which we will mention in the next session, God willing.