Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles

Session Fourteen

Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, Continued Examination of the Objection to the Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Presumption of Continuity, Commentary on the Treatise on Rights, Excellent Secret Conversation and Beseeching with One’s Whole Being

October 1, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion concerned the precedence of presumptive proofs (amarat) over the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah). It is commonly asserted that the precedence of presumptive proofs over the principles is unanimously agreed upon, without dispute. The disagreement lies in the rationale for prioritizing the presumptive proof over the principle. We noted that an objection has been raised regarding the precedence of the presumptive proof over istishab (the presumption of continuity) that must be addressed.

The objection was that if certainty (yaqin) in the narrations of “Do not violate certainty with doubt” is interpreted to refer to intuitive certainty (al-yaqin al-wujdani), then we cannot prioritize the presumptive proof over istishab; this is because the presumptive proof does not yield actual, intuitive certainty. Therefore, it cannot precede istishab, resulting in a conflict between them—whereas everyone maintains that the presumptive proof is prior to istishab.

Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him), relying on certain narrations—including the three sound narrations (sahihah) of Zurarah—stated that certainty in the la tanqud narrations means “proof” (hujjah), rather than that psychological state contrasted with conjecture and doubt, and that doubt means “non-proof” (la hujjah). That is, it is as if the narrations of istishab state: do not violate a proof with a non-proof, but violate a proof with another proof.

Yesterday, discussions took place, and objections and questions were raised. We raised an objection regarding the reliance on the three sound narrations of Zurarah. The response we outlined yesterday is subject to criticism. Now, I wish to defend that response.

Continued Examination of the Objection to the Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Presumption of Continuity

Ultimately, the problem is that, on the one hand, interpreting certainty as “proof” and doubt as “non-proof” in the narrations of istishab resolves the problem, but on the other hand, there is no textual evidence (shahid) from the narration for this. Interpreting certainty as “proof” and doubt as “non-proof” is an interpretation contrary to the apparent meaning (zuhur).

Conversely, if we wish to interpret certainty as customary certainty (al-yaqin al-‘urfi), this indeed has textual evidence in the narrations, but the problem is that it is incompatible with our chosen and preferred premises. This is because we have rejected the apparent ruling (al-hukm al-zahiri), and we have also stated that what is meant is not devotional certainty or the legal assimilation to the status of knowledge (tanzil manzilat al-‘ilm). Therefore, how are we to resolve this dilemma?

The path that appears correct to us is that when the Imam (peace be upon him) states: “Do not violate certainty with doubt,” the Imam cannot mean intuitive certainty; because as Imam Khomeini himself noted: “It rarely occurs” (qalla ma yattafiqu). Based on this, we objected that it is illogical for the Imam to prohibit the violation of something that occurs so rarely. Therefore, it is clear that this is not the intended meaning. Customary certainty in the sense of assurance (itmi’nan) is also not the intended meaning; for although this is compatible with the apparent meaning of the narration, this too does not resolve our problem. That is, even if we interpret it as customary certainty, it still does not assist us.

Imam Khomeini stated: what is meant by certainty here is “proof.” Therefore, the meaning of “Do not violate certainty with doubt” is “Do not violate a proof with a non-proof.” We must analyze and unpack this, without focusing too much on the word “proof” itself. We will first explain the Imam’s objective in these three sound narrations, and subsequently integrate this within the terms and phrases mentioned.

The Imam (peace be upon him), addressing someone who had performed wudu and considered himself pure, and subsequently doubted his purity, in reality wished to state: you, like other rational people, performed an action that was valid and legislated; you performed wudu, and this brought about purity for you [for the state of prayer]. You became pure by means of wudu. This was valid and legislated; it was a rational method and practice to act upon the instruction that reached you. They instructed: “perform wudu and you will become pure.” You, too, performed wudu and deemed yourself pure, and this leads you to the actual reality. If you subsequently doubt or hesitate whether that purity persists or not, at times authoritative testimony (bayyinah) is established for you—two just witnesses come and say, for example, that your wudu has been violated or your garment is impure—and at other times, no presumptive proof or bayyinah indicating the violation of wudu is established for you.

If bayyinah is not established, the Imam states: remain upon that very path that brought about purity for you. What guided you to reality, since no other contrary path has been established at present, remain upon that same state; maintain your state, preserve yourself upon what was (ibqa’ ‘ala ma kan).

However, if bayyinah is established contrary to it—for example, two just witnesses state that your wudu was violated—here, another path and another way to reality has been opened for you; act upon this, for it is contrary to that. That path of yours characterized you with the state of purity; now that you doubt, another path has been established for you and has clarified your situation. At minimum, it claims to lead to reality; act upon this path.

You might say this is the very same explanation of “proof” and “non-proof.” But I wish to assert that although in reality it is the same, it can resolve the problem. This is because when we define the basis of the authority of presumptive proofs as the fact that rational people act upon the presumptive proof—given that if they were to act only upon certainty, their lives would be disrupted, and the only path that leads them to reality is this presumptive proof—therefore, they act upon this, and the Lawgiver has confirmed and validated it.

The Imam, in reality, has referred to what is customarily prevalent among the people, stating: if you previously reached a destination by means of something that led to reality, now too, as long as no contrary path has been established, preserve yourself upon that same result. This is istishab: “Do not violate certainty with doubt”; meaning that path by which you reached reality and which was valid for you, do not destroy it with doubt, unless another valid path…

Question: …

Professor: Why not? Indeed, we interpret it as that very same thing. I noted that we wish to offer a defense. However, instead of using the term “proof” (hujjah), we are analyzing the “proof.” We wish to state that interpreting certainty as “proof” and doubt as “non-proof” is unobjectionable under this analysis and resolves the problem.

Question: The subject of the evidence of istishab does not fundamentally encompass the assumption where the mukallaf possesses a presumptive proof.

Professor: See, ultimately doubt is attained for him, but it states that in the presence of this presumptive proof, do not pay attention to this doubt… so doubt is ultimately attained… this itself is a subject of debate as to whether the precedence is by way of entry (wurud), government (hukumah), or neither? We will discuss this subsequently. At present, in general and regardless of the manner of its precedence—which is itself a subject of debate—the question is: in what sense should we understand this certainty and doubt in the narrations of istishab?

Question: Does the Imam consider someone who possesses a presumptive proof to be covered by this narration?

Professor: The mainstream scholars state that where a presumptive proof exists, we possess devotional certainty; under their premise, there is no issue… ultimately, this psychological state arises for him. However, we say that until the bayyinah is established, he ultimately doubts; he doubts for a moment. But subsequently, he states: “I possess bayyinah.”

It appears that with this explanation, we can defend what the Imam has stated in response to this objection.

Question: We are adding several matters from the outside to the narration.

Professor: The Imam, in reality, wishes to say: that rational path that guided you to reality—do not abandon it with a path that does not lead you to reality or with your hesitations; rather, violate it with a path to reality that the Lawgiver has also validated. As I noted, this is ibaratun ukhra (another phrasing) of “proof” and “non-proof,” but through this explanation, we bring our understanding of “Do not violate certainty with doubt” closer to this concept.

At any rate, we can assert that presumptive proofs are prior to the practical principles, even istishab, and resolve the objection raised regarding istishab. However, the discussion concerns the rationale for prioritizing presumptive proofs over the practical principles.

Commentary on the Treatise on Rights

The final passage of this paragraph of the Risalat al-Huquq of Imam Sajjad is: “And excellent secret conversation with Him in himself, and pleading to Him to release his neck which his errors have encompassed and his sins have consumed; and there is no power except by Allah.”

He states: and excellent secret conversation (munajah) with Allah, the Blessed and Exalted. During prayer, he states that in his heart, he must possess excellent secret conversation with Allah, the Blessed and Exalted, and ask Him to release his soul—that soul which errors and sins have encompassed and brought to destruction. This final passage, in reality, wishes to express a specific point.

Up to this point, Imam Sajjad has mentioned several matters:

The first matter: he enumerated two rights for prayer: “that it is an arrival before Allah” and “that in it you are standing before Allah.” These are the two rights of prayer: one is to know that prayer is in reality a vessel for you to Allah, a means of entering the divine presence. Second, to know that by means of prayer, you stand before God. Prayer brings you to the divine presence; it is the vessel that brings you to that point. And you must know that when you stand upon this vessel, in whose presence you stand.

The second matter was: now that you know what prayer is and in whose presence you stand, you must perform several tasks: 1) heartfelt and internal humility; 2) practical and physical humility, the explanations of which have been provided. That is, humility and submissiveness encompass both internal (jawanih) and physical (jawarih) aspects. We have explained this as well.

Excellent Secret Conversation and Beseeching with One’s Whole Being

The third matter is this (this is distinct from that humility; that which was mentioned, this is a third matter that Imam Sajjad states here): “and excellent secret conversation with Him in himself, and pleading to Him to release his neck.”

This means that a person, within themselves and from the depth of their being, turns toward God and engages in secret conversation (munajah) with Him. “and excellent secret conversation with Him in himself”—excellent secret conversation means in his heart; as for the tongue, it is clear that during prayer there are specific recitations and supplications that must be uttered, but this must take root within him. This must be transformed into an excellent secret conversation from within him. Then, this secret conversation must be accompanied by a complete pleading and request. Whenever a person performs prayer, this state must be present within them. “and pleading to Him to release his neck”—let him think thus and see himself as being encompassed and destroyed by all types and kinds of errors and sins.

Just as if a person’s physical body is encompassed by diseases and their health is endangered, it is akin to destruction—suppose someone whose entire being is consumed by disease, it is as though they are destroyed. Spiritual diseases are identical. Someone who is encompassed by sin, with sin surrounding them, is brought to destruction. Therefore, this is something additional to that state of heartfelt and physical humility. This is distinct from that.

That humility belongs to its proper place (“the humble, the abased, the desiring, the dreading, the hoping, the wretched, the entreating, the one glorifying the One before whom he stands with stillness and casting down of the gaze, and humility of the limbs, and lowering of the wing”). That his limbs and physical organs are lowered and modest. That he places himself in a state of abasement, insignificance, hoping, and weeping. These belong to their proper place.

Aside from that state, heartfelt humility must perform a secret conversation with God in the heart, from the depth of one’s being. This represents a step forward. First, let him deem himself nothing—of course, a nothingness that is not hopeless; nothing, yet hoping for connection to the infinite source, the limitless divine source. A step further is that which prepares him for a deep secret conversation with God.

This “excellent secret conversation”—fundamentally, what does munajah mean? It is derived from najwa (whisper). It is as though a person is pouring out their heart to God, engaging in secret conversation and speaking with Him. That is, to assume himself to be like a destroyed sinner—and this is indeed the reality. His entire being in every prayer must be thus: entirely beseeching, entirely needy, like a runaway and criminal servant when they return to their master—how they fear being punished, and their entire being, especially if they have cut off hope from elsewhere, becomes a request and plea to be released from this situation.

To rescue himself from destruction: “to rescue himself from destruction” (an yunqidha nafsahu min al-halakah). And at the same time, to possess a deep secret conversation, speech, and whisper, from the depth of his heart, with Allah, the Blessed and Exalted. This is the third matter that Imam Sajjad states.

Nonetheless, as in some of the previous passages, because this task is not easy, he states: “and there is no power except by Allah.” This is impossible except by divine power, assistance, help, and support from God. That we wish to perform a prayer wherein we fulfill its right, that our prayer be accompanied by heartfelt and physical humility and excellent secret conversation—that heartfelt humility prepares the person for secret conversation, and thus has a distinct meaning from those two.

He cautions us regarding three tasks, three duties, after the knowledge and awareness of the status of prayer and before whom we stand:

1. That our heart and soul be humble;

2. That our outward state, our movements, and our body also be humble;

3. That we engage in secret conversation with God from the depth of our heart, soul, and being.

And this is not possible except with the help of God. This is the right of prayer.