Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles
Session Sixteen
Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, Al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani’s View on Government, Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s View on Government and His Disagreement with the Sheikh on Two Issues, 5. Customary Reconciliation
October 5, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
We noted that several views exist regarding the rationale or criterion for prioritizing the presumptive proof (amarah) over the practical principle (asl). Some assert government (hukumah); some consider entry (wurud) to be the criterion; some maintain that customary reconciliation (al-jam’ al-‘urfi), which arises following a conflict between presumptive proofs and practical principles, is the criterion; some have outlined a detailed distinction; and others have argued for exception (takhsis).
We noted that it is appropriate to first offer a brief explanation of these concepts as a reminder, and subsequently examine those views.
We briefly outlined the concepts of non-applicability (takhassus), exception (takhsis), and entry (wurud). Regarding government, we noted that the views are diverse, and the issues surrounding it, which are themselves sources of dispute, are numerous. Therefore, this discussion will be explored in greater detail.
The late Sheikh, in two formulations (which do not contradict each other, but rather complement one another, as each addresses a distinct dimension of this reality), stated that government is when one proof, by its verbal implication, is directed at and oversees another proof, either by way of expansion or restriction. We noted that according to the late Sheikh’s formulation, four characteristics must be present in government.
The first characteristic is not unique to government; it is also required in exception and entry—namely, the existence of two proofs. We do not require two proofs in non-applicability, but in exception and entry, the qualifying proof or the entering proof must exist for exception and entry to be realized. Conversely, non-applicability does not require a second proof. Thus, this characteristic is shared.
However, the other characteristics specific to government are:
First, the governing proof must oversee the governed proof; meaning it interprets it or legally assimilates it, as we will explain. It is directed at it, which means it is in the position of either interpretation or legal assimilation.
Second, this overseeing is realized only through verbal implication.
Third, the governing proof is entirely futile without the governed proof.
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani’s View on Government
The late Akhund [al-Khurasani] stated almost identical points regarding government, but he disagreed with the late Sheikh on the third characteristic. That is, he also defines government as the overseeing of one verbal proof over another verbal proof, but he does not accept that the governing proof must be branch-derived from (or dependent upon) the governed proof. His phrasing is: “The branch-derivation of the governing proof from the governed is not considered” (la yu’tabaru tafarru’u dalili al-hakimi ‘ala al-mahkum).
This refers to that third characteristic: that the governing proof is structured such that if the governed proof were not present, it would appear futile. For instance, suppose we possessed no proof conditioning prayer on purity. In that case, the statement “Circumambulating the House is prayer” (al-tawafu bi-l-bayti salatun) would have no meaning and would be futile. When it states that circumambulating the House is prayer, it implies that certain conditions are present in it—meaning, for example, it requires purity just as prayer does, or certain other conditions. Or “There is no doubt for the habitual doubter” (la shakka li-kathir al-shakk) in relation to “If you doubt between three and four, build upon the greater number.” If that proof were absent, “There is no doubt for the habitual doubter” would be futile. This is the third characteristic of the governing proof or government outlined by the Sheikh.
The Akhund states: the branch-derivation of the governing proof from the governed is not required. That is, he agrees that government is undoubtedly a form of one proof overseeing another, and he also agrees that this overseeing must be through a verbal proof. However, regarding the branch-derivation, he possesses a reservation, stating that this overseeing does not need to be actual (fi’li); rather, if the governing proof possesses the potentiality of overseeing (al-nazar al-sha’ni) and the capacity to oversee, that is sufficient.
The implication of this view is that branch-derivation is no longer meaningful. Stating that if the governed proof were absent, the governing proof would be futile, is not necessary. The condition that the governing proof would be futile without the governed proof is realized under the assumption of actual overseeing. However, if we state that potential overseeing is sufficient—meaning that this proof possesses the capacity and potentiality to oversee the governed proof in some manner—this is sufficient. The implication of this view is not branch-derivation. Therefore, even if the governed proof were absent, this proof still possesses the capacity to oversee.
As to whether the late Akhund’s formulation is correct or not, we will not enter into that debate here, as this is not the proper place for it. This is merely a brief explanation of the views and opinions regarding the essence of government.
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s View on Government and His Disagreement with the Sheikh on Two Issues
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini proposed a view on government that differs in some manner from what the Sheikh and the late Akhund proposed. Note that there are two issues which are the points of disagreement between al-Na’ini and the Sheikh.
According to the formulation of the late Sheikh and the Akhund, government is generally realized by intervening in the subject (al-mawdu’). That is, they assert that the governing proof, by overseeing the governed proof, intervenes in the subject of the governed proof, whether by way of expansion (al-tawsi’) or restriction (al-tadyiq). For example, it says: “Honor the scholars” (Akrim al-‘ulama’), and subsequently, by means of another proof, states: “The scholar is the jurist” (Al-‘alimu huwa al-faqih). This is a restriction or an interpretation, because we have two dimensions regarding government: we must attend to two aspects regarding government.
One aspect concerns expansion and restriction, meaning that the governing proof either expands the scope and domain of the subject of the governed proof or restricts its domain. An example of restriction is “There is no doubt for the habitual doubter,” because the habitual doubter is in reality a doubter, but this proof excludes him from the designation of the doubter; thus, restriction has occurred. In other cases, expansion occurs. For example, it says “Honor the scholars,” and subsequently states: “The Hashemite is a scholar” (Al-hashimiyyu ‘alimun). Here, it expands the designation of the scholars, introducing certain individuals into the designation of scholars. This is one aspect.
The other aspect is the manner of overseeing and interpretation—in other words, the governing proof’s overseeing of the governed proof. Sometimes this concerns the scope of the governed proof, and at other times the manner of overseeing. That which concerns the scope is that it sometimes restricts the domain of the subject of the governed proof, and at other times expands it. That which concerns the manner of the governing proof’s overseeing of the governed proof is that this overseeing is either by way of interpretation (tafsir) or by way of legal assimilation (tanzil).
At times, it interprets the subject mentioned in the governed proof, stating who is meant by “scholars” for example. At other times, it legally assimilates, such as the legal assimilation of circumambulating the House to the status of prayer (tanzil al-tawaf manzilat al-salat). This is not interpretation, but rather legal assimilation, because the meaning of prayer and circumambulation is clear, yet He assimilates the latter to the status of the former; this is a type of overseeing.
Question: …
Professor: That is indisputable; I am speaking from one perspective. I noted that there are two aspects: interpretation or legal assimilation. This does not mean it is distinct from expansion and restriction; undoubtedly, there must be expansion and restriction—there is no doubt regarding this. However, as I noted, one concerns the scope and the other concerns the manner and quality of the overseeing. Both must be present. When we say a proof is directed at and oversees another proof, it must clarify both its scope and the manner of overseeing—its quality—both quantitative and qualitative, so to speak.
The late Sheikh and his followers generally interpreted government in such a way that this overseeing is directed only at the subject; meaning that the governing proof only expands or restricts the subject of the governed proof. Perhaps in the minds of most of you, this is also the case: that the governing proof generally intervenes in and modifies the subject of the governed proof, interpreting it and either expanding its scope or restricting its scope.
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini went further, stating that this intervention and overseeing by the governing proof in relation to the governed proof is not restricted to the subject. Rather, the governing proof also intervenes in the ruling (al-hukm) of the governed proof, interpreting it and overseeing it.
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi also explicitly states that sometimes government oversees the ruling, not the subject. This is his phrasing: “What is considered in government is that one of the two proofs oversees the other proof…” Up to this point, there is no difference: we have two proofs, and one proof oversees the other “in some manner” (bi-wajhin ma). This overseeing must be present “even if it is directed at its ruling” (wa law ila hukmihi). His statement that overseeing can be directed “even if at its ruling” is in contrast to the subject. That is, sometimes the overseeing is directed at the subject, and sometimes it is directed at the ruling. This is one difference.
He continues: “and it is not required that it oversee its subject by expanding it or restricting it” (wa la yalzam kawnuhu naziran ila mawdu’ihi bi-tawsi’ihi aw tadyiqih); it does not need to oversee its subject. Although the aspect of expansion or restriction exists, whether in relation to the ruling or in relation to the subject. This is one aspect. This, then, is one point of divergence between the view of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini and al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi and that of the late Sheikh and his followers.
The other issue where they diverge is that, according to the late Sheikh’s view (which the Akhund also accepted), the governing proof must be a verbal proof; in other words, the governing proof’s overseeing of the governed proof is verbal. This is like all the examples we have mentioned thus far—for instance, “There is no doubt for the habitual doubter” in relation to “If you doubt between three and four, build upon the greater number,” which possesses a verbal overseeing. This is a verbal proof that oversees that proof and verbally interprets it. This is derived from the statements of the late Sheikh and the Akhund.
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini states: the governing proof does not necessarily have to be verbal; meaning that a non-verbal proof—such as consensus or the intellect—can also govern a governed proof. For example, suppose the obligatoriness of honoring scholars is established by verbal implication, and subsequently our intellect dictates that a certain specific discipline in which there is corruption and degradation is not “knowledge” (‘ilm). Or there is a consensus that such a thing is fundamentally not knowledge. Here, the intellect or consensus, despite not being a verbal proof, nevertheless oversees that governed proof; this overseeing is not verbal, but is rather by the intellect (bi-l-‘aql) or by consensus (bi-l-ijma’).
These are the two issues of disagreement between al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini and al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi on one hand, and the late Sheikh on the other. He states: the governing proof sometimes intervenes in the “subject-clause” (‘aqd al-wad’) of the governed proof, and sometimes in the “predicate-clause” (‘aqd al-haml). The subject-clause refers to the subject, and the predicate-clause refers to the predicate/ruling.
Despite the disagreement that exists between the view of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini and the late Sheikh, or al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi and the Sheikh, they nevertheless share common ground regarding the essence of government. For instance, that one proof oversees another, that it interprets it or legally assimilates it, and that this is by way of expansion or restriction—these are points of agreement.
We are not currently in the position of passing judgment between the Sheikh, al-Na’ini, and al-Iraqi as to which of them is correct, as this is not really our immediate concern.
5. Customary Reconciliation
There is another concept, which is customary appraisal (al-qariniyyah al-‘urfiya) or, as we noted, customary reconciliation (al-jam’ al-‘urfi), which is also directed at the issue of conflict (ta’arud). This is because customary appraisal or customary reconciliation arises under the assumption of a conflict between two proofs. When two proofs conflict, a discussion arises as to whether it is possible to reconcile them or not.
Customary reconciliation or appraisal—according to which one proof is interpreted in one way and the other in another way—may, for instance, return to exception (takhsis); therefore, it is not considered a fundamentally independent category.