The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), Intellectual Exemption from Obligation, Review of the Objections of Shahid Sadr to the Fourfold Aspects
Session Forty-four
The Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah) – Intellectual Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah) – Review of the Objections of Shahid Sadr to the Fourfold Aspects – Review of the Theory of the Right of Obedience (Haqq al-Ta’ah) – The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Objections – Exposition of the Treatise on Rights (Risalat al-Huquq) – Acceptance of Repentance by Virtue of the Pilgrimage (Hajj)
November 18, 2025
The Second Objection
We have previously stated that the theory of the Right of Obedience (Haqq al-Ta’ah) is subject to several objections. The first objection, which is a fundamental and foundational one, was discussed yesterday. The second objection concerns Shahid Sadr’s assertion that the mainstream jurists (Mashhur) separated the concept of mastership (Mawluwiyyah) from that of obligatoriness/binding force (Munajjiziyyah), claiming that obligatoriness has no inherent connection to mastership. They argued that an obligation only becomes binding through certainty, categorical conviction (Qat’), and actual arrival (Wusul); otherwise, it is not binding. Consequently, they adhered to the intellectual rule of the ugliness of punishment without declaration (Qubh al-Iqab bila Bayan). Shahid Sadr objected to the mainstream view, asserting that separating obligatoriness from mastership is incorrect because obligatoriness is an inseparable implication of the Right of Obedience. For this reason, he extended the domain of the Right of Obedience to encompass even probable obligations.
The objection to his view is that obligatoriness, in terms of its boundaries, does not follow mastership. While it is true that the essence of mastership is connected to obligatoriness—meaning that without mastership, it would be meaningless for an obligation to be rewarded in one instance or for an excuse to be accepted in another—there is no absolute conformity between them regarding their boundaries. Yes, the mastership of God the Almighty is vast, but that it should extend to the point of encompassing even probable obligations is unacceptable. This is because the realm of legislation (Tashri’) must not be analogized to the realm of creation (Takwin). In the realm of creation, we believe in the absolute mastership of God, but in the realm of legislation, as we mentioned yesterday, such absolute scope does not exist. Therefore, extending this mastership to probable obligations is highly problematic.
This is, in fact, another dimension of the same objection. Thus, our objection to Shahid Sadr is that the boundaries of obligatoriness do not follow the boundaries of mastership, and his claim of a necessary correlation (Mulazamah) between the boundaries of obligatoriness and the boundaries of mastership is unacceptable.
The Third Objection
If we were to accept the analogy of legislative mastership to creative mastership and assert that the domain of God’s legislative mastership is identical to His creative mastership—meaning they are equal in their boundaries—the question arises: Why does Shahid Sadr restrict the Right of Obedience or the Right of the Master (Haqq al-Mawluwiyyah) to probable obligations? He argues that the domain of God’s mastership is so vast that if a servant merely deems an obligation probable, intellect dictates that the servant must perform it.
We argue: If we accept such an expansion in legislative mastership, then even in cases where we are certain that no formal obligation exists, but we merely know that the Master desires or wills something, performance should still be deemed obligatory. Under this framework, the formal existence of an obligation (Taklif) loses its independent subjecthood. If the Master who created us, brought us into existence, and bestowed blessings upon us, wills in His mind that the servant perform a certain action—meaning He wills it but has not yet issued a formal command, and we are certain He has not issued a command—the Right of Obedience would still oblige us to fulfill His desire, even though we are certain there is no formal obligation. Yet, Shahid Sadr himself did not step beyond the boundary of probable obligation; he does not assert that if you have knowledge of the Master’s desire while being certain of the absence of a formal obligation, you must still perform it.
We go one step further and argue: Based on the doctrine of the Right of Obedience, the mere probability of the Master’s will should also suffice to necessitate performance. That is, even if we know the Master has not legislated or commanded anything, and we are not certain whether He wills the servant to perform a certain act, but we deem it probable that He wills it, we should perform it. This means that by intellectual decree, not only is performing a probable obligation necessary, but performing a certain will, and even a probable will, must also be necessary. In fact, even performing what is beloved to Him would be necessary. However, Shahid Sadr only recognized the Right of Obedience within the scope of performing probable obligations. The objection is: Why did he restrict this to probable obligations, when he should have gone three steps further to include cases of certain will, probable will, and the Master’s love (Hubb)?
Question:…
Professor: Will (Iradah) means that the preliminary stages are set; something is beloved by the Master, and then an emphasized longing (Shawq Mu’akkad) for its realization arises in Him. Being beloved (Mahbubiyyah) is one step higher; it means something is beloved to God, to the Lawgiver / Legislator; He loves it, even if He has not willed it. We are certain He has not willed it, and we do not even deem His will probable, but we know it is beloved to Him. Here, the Right of Obedience should encompass it. This constitutes the third step.
The Fourth Objection
Shahid Sadr identified the source of the mainstream’s error in separating mastership from obligatoriness as their analogy of true divine mastership to rational, conventional mastership (Mawluwiyyah ‘Uqala’iyyah). Since in conventional mastership, only an arrived obligation (Taklif Wasil) necessitates performance, they assumed the same applies to God’s mastership—that an obligation only becomes binding when it has arrived and is certain. His objection was that comparing God’s mastership to conventional mastership is a false analogy (Qiyas ma’al-Fariq).
Our response to him is: If the mainstream jurists separated obligatoriness from mastership, it was not due to analogizing God’s mastership to conventional mastership. Rather, it is highly probable that the reason for this separation is that they did not see a necessary correlation between the boundaries of obligatoriness and the boundaries of mastership. That is, in the view of the mainstream, there is a correlation between God’s mastership and the obligatoriness of rulings and duties, but there is no conformity in terms of their boundaries; the domain of obligatoriness is narrower than the domain of mastership.
The Fifth Objection
Even if we concede that the mainstream analogized God’s mastership to conventional mastership, the question remains: Can we transcend conventional mastership to reach essential, divine mastership? The apparent meaning of Shahid Sadr’s words is that transcending conventional mastership to God’s mastership is impermissible.
The students of Shahid Sadr have mentioned two possibilities in this regard, both of which are problematic:
The first possibility is that this characteristic does not exist in the base of the analogy (Muqayas ‘Alayh) itself to be extended to the subject of the analogy. That is, conventional mastership itself is of such a nature that the Right of Obedience in it is not conditioned upon the arrival of the obligation, so there is no basis to extend it to God’s mastership.
The second possibility is that in conventional mastership, the Right of Obedience is indeed conditioned upon arrival, but due to a specific characteristic, we cannot extend and apply it to God’s mastership.
We have explained these two possibilities in detail and raised objections against both of them.
The Sixth Objection
Shahid Sadr stated: If the Lawgiver / Legislator has endorsed and validated the common path of conventional masteries (which dictates that an obligation must arrive to necessitate performance), this would amount to proving scriptural exemption (Bara’ah Shar’iyyah), whereas we are currently discussing intellectual exemption (Bara’ah ‘Aqliyyah). Shahid Sadr’s reliance here is on the premise that the rational agents (Uqala) have a conduct and practice (Sirah) which, if endorsed, constitutes scriptural exemption, while our discussion is on intellectual exemption.
The objection here is that the issue is not one of the conduct of rational agents requiring endorsement by the Lawgiver / Legislator; rather, it is a matter of the necessary correlation between the religious ruling and the decree of practical intellect. If we approach this through the path of correlation, Shahid Sadr’s objection will no longer stand.
The Seventh Objection
Relying on the premise that God’s mastership, like His other attributes, is at the most perfect level, Shahid Sadr concluded that in preserving the reverence of the Master and obeying Him, the most perfect level of obedience must also be observed. He states that since this Master is at the highest level, we, as His servants, must obey Him at the highest level, and the highest level of obedience is to act even when we deem an obligation merely probable.
Our objection here is: What proof is there that if the mastership of the Master is at the highest level, obedience must also necessarily be at the highest level? There is no necessary correlation between the most perfect level of mastership and the most perfect level of obedience. Furthermore, as we mentioned earlier, he himself does not seem to adhere to the most perfect level in the domain of obedience; for he says only probable obligations must be performed, whereas above probable obligations, we also have certain will, probable will, certain belovedness, and probable belovedness. Therefore, in all of these, the probabilities should be performed. Thus, it is as if he himself has restricted this scope.
The Eighth Objection
Another objection relates to his statement regarding the possibility of permission (Tarkhis) in the cases of personal, non-specific knowledge (Ilm Ijmali). He states that according to the doctrine of the Right of Obedience, the possibility of permission exists regarding all sides of non-specific knowledge.
The objection is that if permission is granted to abandon one of the sides of non-specific knowledge, this leads to violating specific, detailed knowledge (‘Ilm Tafsili). It is true that we have non-specific knowledge, and the sides of this knowledge are both presented as probabilities, but here we have something called the “universal/common denominator” (Jami’). The common denominator between the sides is known in detail; we know with certainty that on Friday, a specific obligation—a prayer—is obligatory upon us. If we accept the possibility of permission regarding all sides of non-specific knowledge, it means we have accepted the possibility of permission regarding the detailed knowledge of the common denominator, which is certainly impermissible. That is, if the intellect says you can omit the Noon prayer, or if it says you can omit the Friday prayer, this means I can abandon a mandatory obligation, and it is impossible for the Lawgiver / Legislator to issue such a permission.
These were the objections we outlined briefly. Thus, our discussion on intellectual exemption from obligation (Bara’ah ‘Aqliyyah) is practically complete, and God willing, we shall enter the discussion on scriptural exemption (Bara’ah Shar’iyyah). It has become clear up to this point that the mainstream view is correct; the ugliness of punishment without declaration (Qubh al-Iqab bila Bayan) and intellectual exemption are established.
Exposition of the Treatise on Rights (Risalat al-Huquq)
“The right of the Pilgrimage (Hajj) is that you know it is an arrival before your Lord, a flight to Him from your sins, and through it, your repentance is accepted.”
This sentence, following the explanation of the two rights we referred to in previous sessions, indicates that through Hajj and by virtue of Hajj, your repentance is accepted. Is this no longer part of the rights? This is the fruit and the result.
Acceptance of Repentance by Virtue of the Pilgrimage (Hajj)
He explained the right of Hajj: first, that you know “it is an arrival before your Lord,” and second, that you know “it is a flight to Him from your sins.” We have explained those two rights. Then he states: by virtue of Hajj, your repentance is accepted. This is the effect and fruit of Hajj. What does it mean that your repentance is accepted by virtue of Hajj?
An important point to consider here is that Hajj requires a series of prior preparations. If a person proceeds with these preparations, they can complete them and, of course, acquire new spiritual states. The apparent meaning of the Imam’s words is that by virtue of Hajj, your repentance is accepted. This expression indicates that a person must repent before Hajj, or during Hajj, so that by virtue of the act of Hajj, their repentance is accepted.
In a tradition from Imam al-Sadiq (as)—which is a lengthy narration—he states: “When you intend to perform Hajj…” After explaining a series of actions and duties, he reaches this point: “Then wash yourself with the water of sincere repentance from sins.” He says: wash away your sins with the water of sincere repentance. This relates to the period before Hajj. He states: when you decide to perform Hajj, make a real, sincere repentance; the very same that God the Almighty refers to in Surah al-Tahrim: “O you who have believed, repent to God with sincere repentance.” Therefore, repentance must take place before Hajj, but the acceptance of repentance is by virtue of Hajj.
In a tradition from the Messenger of Allah (saw), it is narrated: “Perform Hajj and Umrah consecutively; for they eliminate poverty and sins just as the bellows eliminates the dross of iron.” He says: perform Hajj and Umrah continuously, for these two eliminate poverty and sins, just as the furnace removes the rust of iron. The iron placed in the furnace has its rust removed; Hajj and Umrah similarly eliminate sin and poverty.
Likewise, a tradition is narrated from Imam al-Baqir (as): “Whoever sets out for this House as a pilgrim for Hajj or Umrah, free from arrogance, shall return from his sins in the state he was on the day his mother gave birth to him.” Imam al-Baqir (as) says: whoever visits this House with the intention of Hajj or Umrah and is free from arrogance (which is remarkable)—these are the very preparations one must cultivate within oneself before Hajj. It is not the case that someone, with their usual state of mind, with their arrogance, with their vanity, without repenting, just gets up and goes there without any initial change or intention of change in themselves, and expects all of this to be achieved; this is impossible. He says: one who goes with the intention of Hajj or Umrah, meaning truly sincerely, not to show off or to be talked about, and is free from arrogance—arrogance being the worst trait of man—this person returns sinless, like the day his mother gave birth to him; meaning nothing of his sins remains.
Sheikh Saduq narrates in Thawab al-A’mal wa Iqab al-A’mal: “Indeed, God, the Mighty and Sublime, forgives the pilgrim, the family of the pilgrim, the clan of the pilgrim, and whomever the pilgrim seeks forgiveness for.” Of course, this has a detailed discussion which we will address in the next session.