The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), Textual Exemption, Five Points, Point One

Session Forty-Five

The Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah), Textual Exemption (Bara’ah Shar’iyyah), Five Points, Point One: The Meaning of Doubt, Point Two: The Object of Doubt in terms of Particularity and Universality, Point Three: The Meaning of Obligation

November 29, 2025

Textual Exemption

Following the explanation of the discussions related to rational exemption (al-bara’ah al-‘aqliyyah), we now proceed to examine textual exemption (al-bara’ah al-shar’iyyah). Prior to entering the proofs of textual exemption, addressing several points appears necessary. On this occasion, I deem it appropriate to explain five points prior to presenting the proofs of textual exemption.

It is obvious that the domains of application (majari) of the practical principles, whichever formulation is proposed, are subject to debate, and doubt regarding the obligation (al-shakk fi-l-taklif) represents the primary context for the execution of exemption. Given that the axis of the current discussion is textual exemption, we highlight this point here; otherwise, this issue is not restricted to textual exemption and can also be raised in rational exemption. At any rate, the primary context of exemption is precisely doubt regarding the obligation.

Five Points

Now, the question arises: what is meant by “doubt regarding the obligation”? This title consists of two primary terms: “doubt” (shakk) and “obligation” (taklif). Here, we intend to outline two points regarding “doubt” and one point regarding “obligation”:

First, what is meant by “doubt”?
Second, what is the object of this doubt? Meaning, is the doubted obligation a particular (juz’i) or a universal (kulli) obligation, and which of these is the axis of discussion here?
Third, what is the meaning of “obligation”? This is because any ambiguity or lack of clarity regarding these points and topics can serve as a source of objections. Emphasizing these points does not mean they are unaddressed; rather, it is a review of concepts that you have previously heard and are familiar with. These three points, which are related to the very title of doubt regarding the obligation, must be explained. Two other points must also be addressed:
Fourth, a brief reference to the difference of opinion between the legal theorists (usuliyyin) and the traditionalists (akhbariyyin) regarding textual exemption.
Fifth, we will conduct a brief comparative review of the methodologies of the Great Sheikh (al-Ansari) and the late Akhund al-Khurasani in this discussion, pay close attention to the order of their presentations, and determine the correct framework for pursuing the discussion.

Point One: The Meaning of Doubt

Doubt (shakk) in its technical sense refers to the state of equi-probability of the two sides (tasawi al-tarafayn); meaning that doubt possesses no revealing value (kashf) regarding actual reality, in contrast to conjecture (zann), which possesses a degree of revealing value in brief, and certainty (qat’), which possesses complete revealing value. Of course, the Lawgiver has validated some of these incomplete revealing values (such as certain specific conjectures) and has rejected others. However, conjecture by its very nature possesses a degree of revealing value. In contrast, illusion (wahm) represents a subordinated revealing value; meaning that the degree of revealing value in illusion is extremely weak, to the extent that from one perspective it may be considered to lack revealing value entirely. When the probability of one side is extremely negligible, it can no longer be described as revealing.

Doubt (in its technical sense) refers to that state which arises within the horizon of the person’s soul on the basis of which the two sides are equal; no predominant probability exists, nor is there a subordinated probability contrary to it, but rather complete hesitation reigns.

However, “doubt” in this context (namely, in the discussion of the practical principles), is broader than its technical sense. What is meant by doubt here is the absence of knowledge (‘adam al-‘ilm) and the absence of certainty (‘adam al-yaqin). When we state that the domain of the practical principles is doubt, the broader meaning of this concept is intended; meaning that it encompasses conjecture (zann), technical doubt (shakk), and illusion (wahm).

For example, if we state that we doubt whether purity persists or not, this does not necessarily mean the equi-probability of the two sides. You may entertain a sixty-percent probability of the persistence of purity, and yet it is still considered doubt. If you entertain a seventy-percent probability of the persistence of purity, it is still doubt. However, when you apply istishab (the presumption of continuity), it is as if this is no longer doubt; rather, it means we must apply the effects of actual reality to it or legally assimilate it to the status of reality.

Therefore, what is meant by “doubt” in this context is whatever is other than knowledge and certainty—the absence of knowledge, the absence of certainty—encompassing conjecture, technical doubt, and illusion. In reality, the subject of the practical principles is “doubt.” As we noted, we are not concerned with the various phrasings outlined here; nor is it important whether some of these principles are applied and executed specifically in cases of doubt or certain divisions of doubt. We merely seek to state that “doubt” has this meaning.

Point Two: The Object of Doubt in terms of Particularity and Universality

Doubt sometimes relates to a particular matter (amr juz’i) and at other times to a universal matter (amr kulli). By a particular matter, we mean, for example: has this garment of mine become impure or not? This is a particular ruling—the particular ruling of the impurity of my garment at this time and this place. This relates to an external subject (mawdu’ khariji).

At other times, the doubt relates to a universal divine ruling (hukm kulli ilahi); for example, doubt regarding the obligatoriness of reciting a supplication upon sighting the crescent moon (al-du’a’ ‘inda ru’yat al-hilal). For whatever reason, I have doubted whether reciting a supplication upon sighting the crescent moon is obligatory or not. This no longer relates to me as a mukallaf specifically, but is rather a universal divine ruling. Now, the cause of this doubt may be various factors—for instance, I have seen a narration that is not highly reliable, or suppose a text has been transmitted that is ambiguous, or a conflict has arisen between two texts. Various reasons can exist for doubt.

At any rate, the doubt relates to a universal divine ruling, such as doubt regarding the obligatoriness of the Friday prayer during the era of Occultation, or doubt regarding the obligatoriness of Hajj upon an able person under specific conditions. All of these are universal divine rulings.

What is discussed in this context is primarily directed at that universal divine ruling. That is, in the science of Usul, the discussion centers mostly on doubt regarding universal divine rulings. If subjects or particular rulings are discussed, it is perhaps by way of digression (istitradan). That we say a discussion is digressive is because the proper place for this discussion is not in the science of Usul; regardless of whether we consider these principles to run in particular cases and external subjects or not. For example, regarding some practical principles like istishab, some argue that it does not run in universal rulings, but only in external subjects.

At any rate, its application in subjects belongs properly to the science of jurisprudence (fiqh) rather than Usul; because the science of Usul is responsible for those rules by means of which we either deduce universal religious rulings or find a proof for religious rulings. Naturally, these Usuli rules that are directed at the deduction of religious rulings, or which assist the mukallaf practically in the state of confusion, relate primarily and mostly to universal divine rulings. Under this assumption, if we have exerted all our efforts, searched extensively, and found no proof, what is our duty? What duty lies upon the mukallaf? This is a universal divine ruling that also encompasses all mukallafs. However, regarding doubt in subjects and particular cases, the proper place for its discussion is not the science of Usul, and if it is discussed in Usul, it is by way of digression.

Point Three: The Meaning of Obligation

By the meaning of obligation (taklif), we do not mean its lexical definition, but rather the discussion is whether what is meant is a specific type of obligation or whether it encompasses both species (naw’) and genus (jins). This is because obligation is sometimes binding (ilzami) and at other times non-binding (ghayr-ilzami). Binding obligation encompasses the obligatory (wajib) and the prohibited (haram). Non-binding obligation encompasses the recommended (mustahabb) and the detested (makruh).

Question: Does exemption (bara’ah) from “obligation” also encompass non-binding obligation?

Professor: Obligation lexically means enjoining hardship, but it is broader than bindingness and non-bindingness. The rulings of commission and omission (al-ahkam al-taklifiyyah) are divided into five categories. If it is not an obligation, it is not referred to as obligatory, recommended, or detested. That case is technically distinct. The term “obligation” is also raised here.

We have one type of obligation—namely, binding obligation—which is divided into the obligatory and the prohibited: the obligating duty is one species, and the prohibiting duty is another species, but they share the genus of bindingness. Non-binding obligation is also of two types: the recommended and the detested. Of course, we can also say, with a degree of leniency, that the permissible (mubah) is another type of obligation; meaning that ultimately a ruling has been outlined here. When we say “permissible,” this is a religious ruling; meaning its commission and omission are equal in your regard and neither has any preference. Non-binding obligation is also of two types: recommendability and detestability.

When we say doubt regarding the obligation, does it mean doubt regarding the species of the obligation—meaning doubt regarding the obligatory, prohibited, recommended, or detested? Or does it mean what is broader than doubt in the species and the genus? One potential interpretation is that what is meant is specifically doubt in the genus. This interpretation is rejected; no one asserts that doubt regarding the obligation means doubt in the genus of the obligation and does not encompass doubt in the species of the obligation. Thus, this interpretation is set aside. Two other possibilities remain:

One is that what is meant by doubt regarding the obligation is that we possess doubt regarding the species of the obligation.

The other is that what is meant is broader; meaning both doubt in the species and doubt in the genus.

For example: we doubt whether smoking tobacco (shurb al-tutun) is prohibited or not. (This example is for a prohibitory doubt). We also have an example for an obligatory doubt: is the supplication upon sighting the crescent moon obligatory? Is the Friday prayer during the era of Occultation obligatory?

If we doubt the obligatoriness of something or the prohibition of something, naturally this is doubt in the species, whereas the core bindingness is certain for us—we are certain that the Lawgiver has a binding obligation, but we do not know what this binding obligation is. Here, we can say that what is meant by doubt regarding the obligation is that you possess neither knowledge of the species of the obligation nor knowledge of the genus. This becomes broader: doubt regarding the obligation means doubt in what is broader than the species and the genus. Sometimes we say: doubt regarding the obligation does not encompass the genus; doubt regarding the obligation is only where the species is unknown to us.

Both possibilities exist. Therefore, some have examined this by paying close attention to this very aspect. For example, the late Akhund al-Khurasani raised several objections against the Great Sheikh here, which, according to this perspective, are no longer applicable.

In brief, I assert that what is understood from the collective discussions is that in the issue of exemption, the broader meaning is not intended. Ultimately, doubt has ranks and varies in each place according to its ranks. Sometimes we possess doubt in both the species and the genus; we know nothing of the obligation. This is also a manifestation of doubt regarding the obligation.

Question: …

Professor: In cases where the core bindingness is known to us, but we hesitate regarding the species—for example, we know that this is a binding obligation, but we do not know whether it is obligatory or prohibited—this becomes, for instance, a manifestation of doubt regarding the duty-bound action (al-shakk fi-l-mukallaf bih).

Doubt in the genus itself is of two types: doubt in bindingness, and doubt in non-bindingness. Both are manifestations of doubt in the genus. We do not know whether this has been made binding or not. Here, it is the domain of exemption. If we possess doubt in both the species and the genus—knowing neither the bindingness nor the species—this is also the domain of exemption, in both. If we possessed doubt in the species, but the genus was not doubtful to us, this would no longer be considered among the manifestations of doubt regarding the obligation.

Question: …

Professor: No, that case does not differ. If we doubt the recommendability of something, exemption also negates the recommendability… these cases do not differ from one another. If we doubt the detestability of something, exemption also negates it. In this respect, no difference exists… this is fundamentally an incorrect statement.

At any rate, what is meant by obligation here has also been clarified.

The Topic of the Next Session

Two other points also remain, which I will present tomorrow, God willing.