The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, The First Proof

Session Fifty-One

The Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, The First Proof: The Book, The Second Verse, Analysis of the Second Verse, Objection, Analysis of the Interpretations, Al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi’s Discourse, Part Three, Analysis of Parts One, Two, and Three of al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi’s Discourse

December 7, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

In the argumentation based on the verse “Allah does not charge a soul except [according to] what He has given it” (la yukallifu Allahu nafsan illa ma ataha) to establish the Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah), it was outlined that according to the arguer’s view, the relative pronoun “ma” means “obligation” and “ataha” means “clarification of the obligation.” On the basis of this view, until an obligation is clarified and announced, no obligation is established, and an obligation is established only when it is announced and clarified.

In the critique of this verse, it was noted that four interpretations exist regarding it. The fourth interpretation was that “ma” is employed in the common denominator (qadr-e-jami’) of all meanings, and consequently “ataha” also has a general meaning. Subsequently, regarding whether the fourth interpretation is conceptually possible at the level of reality (maqam al-thubut) or not, the objector claimed that this interpretation is conceptually impossible, but al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini through one path and al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi through another argued for its possibility at the level of reality.

We criticized the discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, but we noted that al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi’s discourse consists of three parts. We explained the first and second parts yesterday, and the third part of his discourse remained to be addressed, which we will now outline, and subsequently we will analyze all three parts.

The first part of his discourse was that fundamentally, from the perspective of the level of reality, there is no obstacle to the fourth interpretation; because we do not need to search for a common denominator and face its complications, but rather we can state that “ma” means “thing” and “ataha” also acquires its specific meaning according to those cases.

In the second part, he stated: assuming that such an interpretation is conceptually possible from the perspective of the level of reality, the problem lies at the level of proof (maqam al-ithbat); meaning that the verse cannot establish exemption. This is because if it is to establish exemption according to this interpretation, the verse must have absolute application (itlaq), but due to the existence of the definitive minimum in the context of address (qadr-e-mutaqayyan fi maqam al-takhatub), we cannot rely upon the absolute application of the verse. We outlined these two parts.

Continuation of the Discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi

The third part of al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi’s discourse is that even if we concede (sallamna) that the verse does not face that conceptual obstacle at the level of reality, and that at the level of proof there is no problem regarding this meaning, nevertheless a greater problem exists here, and that is the proofs of precaution (ihtiyat). That is, if this verse indicates exemption, it is defeated by the proofs of precaution.

His argument is that the proofs of precaution and the narrations requiring precaution in prohibitory doubts govern (hakim) this verse. This is because the import of the verse is that if an obligation has not reached the mukallafs and has not been clarified, that obligation is not established. However, the import of the proofs of precaution is that precaution must be observed in prohibitory doubts—meaning they establish an obligation for us.

According to the view of the traditionalists (akhbāriyyīn), these proofs face no flaw in terms of their chain of transmission and textual indication. Therefore, if these proofs are accepted, they govern this verse; because according to this verse, in cases where no obligation has been communicated and clarified, exemption runs, but the traditionalists claim that here an obligation exists, and the obligation is precisely precaution in prohibitory doubts—meaning the enjoining of precaution where we doubt the prohibition of something. Therefore, with the existence of these proofs, we cannot rely upon this verse.

Consequently, this verse lacks the capacity to resist the proofs of precaution and is defeated by them [21].

Analysis of the Discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi

In all three parts, there are observations regarding his words.

He stated in the first part: from the perspective of the level of reality, the possibility exists that a general meaning is conceptualized in the verse, and “ma” is interpreted to mean “thing” and “ita” is interpreted in accordance with what is mentioned in the verse. However, this view is subject to objection. Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him) has also raised this objection against al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi.

The objection is that, while it is true that the relative pronoun can possess a general meaning (in the sense of “thing”) and the relative clause can also possess a general meaning (“ita” in a general meaning that encompasses “ma” in the sense of wealth, obligation, and the action of the mukallaf alike), the difficulty lies in the fact that for each of these meanings which function as an object, the meaning of the verb itself (meaning “to obligate”) is clear, but its object and the relation that exists between the verb and the object is a relational meaning (ma’na harfi). The relation between the verb and the object is among the relational meanings (al-ma’ani al-harfiyyah), which do not possess independence, but rather their existence is dependent upon the two sides; a meaning that is dependent upon the verb and the object itself.

Relational meanings are particular/concrete meanings (ma’ani juz’iyyah). This is the very premise of the Imam himself, who states that because the relational meaning is dependent upon the two sides, it is a particular meaning. We cannot conceptualize a universal relational meaning. Therefore, the relation between the verb and the direct object, and the relation between the verb and the absolute object, cannot be identical; because they are relational meanings, and relational meanings cannot be applied to one another and cannot be combined.

In addition, their rank is fundamentally different. The rank of the absolute object is like an adjective after the verb (ba’da al-fi’l), whereas the rank of the direct object is prior to the verb (qabla al-fi’l). Two things that exist in two different ranks cannot be considered together. These are mutually exclusive, and they possess no aspect of commonality or combination. This is not in terms of phrasing, but in terms of reality and conceptualization. That is, first a reality called the direct object must exist for the action of the verb to fall upon it, and this is indeed the case both in terms of external existence and mental conceptualization. However, regarding the absolute object, this is not the case. Therefore, their rank is different. This is an objection that appears valid against al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi.

The second part of his discourse was that the definitive minimum in the context of address prevents relying upon the absolute application of the verse, and in this verse, the definitive minimum exists. The definitive minimum in this verse is wealth, in light of what precedes the verse, namely, “Let a man of wealth spend from his wealth, and he whose provision is restricted – let him spend from what Allah has given him.” If we wish to rely upon the absolute application, one of the premises of wisdom (muqaddimat al-hikmah) is the non-existence of the definitive minimum in the context of address; and here it exists, and this prevents relying upon the absolute application.

As I noted yesterday, this very premise is itself a subject of debate: namely, whether the non-existence of the definitive minimum in the context of address is accepted as one of the premises of wisdom or not. Many scholars have not accepted this condition and premise. Although the late Akhund presented this as one of the premises of wisdom, it has been rejected by several scholars. Therefore, a premise-based disagreement exists in this regard.

Now, on this basis, for someone who does not accept the existence of the definitive minimum in the context of address as one of the premises of wisdom, naturally no obstacle exists to relying upon the absolute application here. Therefore, at the level of proof as well, no problem appears to exist.

The third part of al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi’s discourse was that the verse “Allah does not charge a soul except [according to] what He has given it,” like the verse “And never would We punish until We sent a messenger,” lacks the capacity to resist the proofs of the obligatoriness of precaution in prohibitory doubts. This is because the fact that God does not obligate human beings in relation to unannounced and uncommunicated obligations is a point of consensus for everyone.

The entire dispute and contention is whether in these cases (doubts) an obligation exists or not. The traditionalists believe that in prohibitory doubts, this obligation exists—the obligation of precaution. And relying on these proofs, the aforementioned verse is defeated by these proofs; meaning that the proofs of the obligatoriness of precaution and the narrations indicating the obligatoriness of precaution in prohibitory doubts are prior to this verse. The verse states: “Allah does not charge a soul except [according to] what He has given it” (meaning what has been announced and clarified). The proofs of the obligatoriness of precaution, on their part, are that very announced obligation; precaution itself is an obligation in cases of doubt.

This statement of al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi is also not free of objection, because:

Sometimes we consider the obligatoriness of precaution in prohibitory doubts as an independent obligation (taklif mustaqill), on par with other actual obligations such as prayer and fasting. The result of this view is that performing precaution is itself an independent obligation that possesses an independent reward and punishment.

Another view is that the obligatoriness of precaution is merely a path-indicative (procedural) method to preserve actual reality; meaning that, for example, smoking tobacco is sometimes prohibited as an obligation, the prohibition of smoking tobacco is established according to actual reality, and this ruling reaches the mukallaf, which is naturally an actual prohibition. At other times, smoking tobacco is prohibited according to actual reality, but its obligation does not reach us. There, in cases of a doubtful obligation or doubt regarding the obligation, it is stated: observe precaution.

This precaution, according to the second view, is no longer an independent obligation, but is rather a path to prevent the person from falling into disobedience; a path that secures the person from the danger of destruction and falling into the corruption of disobedience.

The difference and outcome between these two views is:

If we say it is an independent obligation on par with other obligations, this means that the action itself has an independent punishment and reward; meaning it is an independent subject for reward and punishment. However, if we say no, this is merely a path-indicative obligation, this precaution is for you to be certain that you have conformed to actual reality, otherwise precaution itself has no punishment or reward.

With this explanation, suppose a person, while obligated to observe precaution in a circumscribed doubt (al-shubhah al-mahsurah) where they possess compendious knowledge (‘ilm ijmali) of its obligatoriness or prohibition—meaning they must abandon both sides, or if it is an obligatory doubt, perform both sides—nevertheless does not do so and only performs one side. Example: they must perform both the noon prayer and the Friday prayer at Friday noon, but they perform only one; or they must avoid both in a prohibitory doubt, but avoid only one.

Here, if by chance this action conforms to reality—meaning that the side they committed in the prohibitory doubt was, by chance, not prohibited—according to the first view, this person must be rewarded. However, according to the second view, they receive no reward; because this was merely a path that protected them.

Conversely, if the opposite occurs—meaning the action does not conform to reality—under the first assumption they must be punished, but under the second assumption they are not punished (rather, they have merely acted audaciously/defiantly (mutajarri); meaning they acted with the intention of committing a prohibition, but by chance it was not prohibited). This is the difference between these two.

Now, the objection directed at al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi is that Almighty God has never raised the obligatoriness of precaution as an independent obligation on par with other obligations. The obligation has been outlined only where a person possesses compendious knowledge, a circumscribed doubt, and that too for the sake of preserving them from falling into the destruction of disobedience.

With this perspective, the proofs of the obligatoriness of precaution no longer govern this verse; at most, they conflict with each other. This verse states: as long as an obligation has not arrived, you can consider yourself free of obligation; as long as an obligation is not communicated, no obligation exists. The proofs of precaution state: as long as an obligation is not established, you must observe precaution. Therefore, a conflict arises between these two categories of proofs, rather than one governing the other and the verse being unable to resist them.

Question: …

Professor: Yes, in his view, this is how it is. He claims they govern (hakim). He is fundamentally stating that there is no possibility of entry. He negates the possibility of entry and prepares the ground to argue for government. The late Sheikh himself also states they govern. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini also states they govern.

The discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi is seemingly built upon the premise that the obligation to observe precaution is an independent obligation (on par with other obligations). However, if we say that the obligation to observe precaution is not an independent obligation, but rather a path to preserve the person from disobedience, then it can no longer govern the verse, but will merely conflict with it.