The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Seventy-Four

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, Second Topic: Examination of the Exclusivity or Non-Exclusivity of “ma” to Particular Doubts, The Five Paths, The First Path, The Objection of Muhaqqiq Khoei, The Second Path, The Objections of Muhaqqiq Iraqi, The First Objection, The Second Objection

January 19, 2026

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Summary of the Previous Session

We mentioned that regarding the relative pronoun ma, certain topics must be raised. The first topic was concerning whether the attribution of “lifting” (raf’) to “ma la ya’lamun” (that which they do not know) is literal or figurative, and if it is figurative, what is the legitimizing factor (musahhih) for this attribution? This discussion was examined.

The second topic is whether the relative pronoun ma in this hadith is exclusive to action (fi’l) or also encompasses rulings (ahkam). In other words, is the Hadith of Lifting exclusive to particular doubts (shubhat mawdu’iyyah) or is it broader, encompassing both particular and ruling-directed doubts (shubhat hukmiyyah)? For if it is exclusive to particular doubts, it is no longer suitable for the argumentation in the discussion of Exemption.

The Five Paths

We mentioned that some paths or clues have been resorted to in order to prove exclusivity to particular doubts or the external action. At least five paths and methods have been stated, or five clues have been claimed by various individuals, to the effect that ma does not encompass rulings and ruling-directed doubts.

The First Path

The first path is that lifting (raf’) and enactment (wad’) stand in opposition (taqabul) and apply to one and the same subject matter (yatawaradani ‘ala mawridin wahid); meaning that very thing to which enactment has attached is also what lifting attaches to. Opposite to legislation (ja’l) is lifting; placing and removing. The object of enactment is action; for example, when it is said that prayer is obligatory, or it is said that this duty is binding upon you, it means an action is established upon the liability of the duty-bound (mukallaf). Fundamentally, duty (taklif) means “placing the action upon the liability of the duty-bound” (wad’ al-fi’l ‘ala dhimmat al-mukallaf). If we are told that Friday prayer is obligatory, it means the action of Friday prayer is established upon our liability. Or prohibition (hurmah); it makes no difference, prohibition is also a duty, meaning the omission of that action is established upon the liability of the duty-bound. Now, since the object of enactment and legislation is action, and the enactment of duty and legislation of duty means legislating an action and deed upon the liability of the duty-bound, lifting also attaches to action. The very thing that was enacted is what is lifted. If Friday prayer was made obligatory, its lifting now lies in this action being removed from the liability of the duty-bound.

Therefore, what is meant by the relative pronoun ma in this hadith is external actions, meaning those very subjects; meaning that which of the actions of which you have no knowledge, in which you have doubt or ignorance, is removed from your liability. Thus, it does not encompass ruling-directed doubts.

He states: the indicative value and witness-nature of this path regarding exclusivity to particular doubts is based on our considering the vessel of lifting and enactment to be the liability of the duty-bound; meaning we say: Allah, Blessed and Exalted is He, placed this action upon the liability of the duty-bound. Ultimately, this enactment must occur in some vessel. If we say enactment is meaningful with respect to the liability of the duty-bound, and Allah placed this action upon the liability of the duty-bound, naturally lifting—as it stands in opposition to enactment and both apply to one and the same subject matter—also attaches to this very action.

Therefore, this clue possesses indicative value only if we consider the vessel of enactment and lifting to be the liability of the duty-bound, whereas it is not so. The vessel of enactment and lifting is the sacred law (shar’) of Islam, the shari’ah, and the world of legislation. The vessel of enactment is this: Allah, Blessed and Exalted is He, says: in the sphere of shari’ah and lawmaking, I placed this action upon the duty-bound. This clue also says the same: in this sphere, I removed this ruling from the duty-bound.

Therefore, if we consider the sphere of enactment and lifting to be the Islamic shari’ah, the object of enactment and lifting is also the ruling (hukm), not the action (fi’l). When Allah says: I established obligatoriness and prohibition, when He says: in the sphere of the sacred law I enacted and legislated these—meaning I established a series of rulings—its lifting also means the lifting of those very rulings. Its clue is also “lifted from my nation” (rufi’a ‘an ummati); “lifted from my nation” means “the lifting of the nine in the Islamic shari’ah,” these nine cases have been removed in the Islamic shari’ah and in the religious and legislative sphere.

Question: …

Professor: What does “my nation” mean? From my nation, these rulings are lifted… Fundamentally, what does shar’ (sacred law) mean? Shari’ah means the set of rulings and regulations. Truly, whether we consider the object of enactment and lifting to be rulings or actions, which one is more compatible with the position of legislation and lawmaking?

Question: …

Professor: Therefore, in all of them we also say it is like this… Of course, some other clues have also been stated, which we shall also answer, but that fundamentally the Islamic shari’ah means a set of rulings and regulations; truly, what is that which is enacted in this sphere? Yes, the addressees are the duty-bound and these rulings are legislated for the duty-bound, but does God place the action upon the duty-bound or the ruling?… In the sphere of legislation, does God place these upon the liability of the duty-bound, or are the people the addressees of religion? Religion and shari’ah are a set of dos and don’ts; this is the legislative sphere. It becomes clear that this is a vessel in which the legislator constantly places things in that sphere and removes things from it; now, as to how much, we are not concerned with that. Enactment (wad’) means legislation (ja’l); is this other than that? Does this legislation attach to something?… All of them; prayer is established, “kutiba” means “it became obligatory” (wajaba), wajabat al-salat; He does not say: I enacted the prayer (wada’tu al-salat) or I legislated the prayer (ja’altu al-salat). Indeed, the verses generally support this meaning that He enacts obligatoriness or prohibition, and even if in one place He directly attaches enactment to the action, this is in view of the ruling and its object.

Therefore, it appears that this path is incorrect.

The Second Path

The Second Path: The unity of context (wahdat al-siyaq) dictates that what is meant by ma in “ma la ya’lamun” is the external action; ma la ya’lamun of external actions, that of actions which is unknown to you is lifted. For example, we want to drink a liquid which we do not know whether it is wine or vinegar, wine or water, but we doubt whether this is drinking water or drinking wine; the doubt is in the applicability of the title of this action to drinking wine or drinking water. Now, what is this unity of context?

In the other phrases of this hadith, such as “the lifting of ma-dturru ‘alayh” or “the lifting of ma-stukrihu ‘alayh” or “ma la yatiqun”, what is meant is certainly the external action itself, because what necessity, coercion, and their likes attach to is the external action; coercion is regarding a deed, coercion regarding a ruling is meaningless. “The lifting of ma-dturru ‘alayh” means an action for which you developed necessity. “The lifting of ma-stukrihu ‘alayh” means that deed regarding which you were coerced. Therefore, since in the other phrases of the narration what is meant by ma is action, by virtue of the clue of the unity of context, what is intended in “ma la ya’lamun” is also the external action; because there it is impossible for the ruling to be intended, since necessity and coercion regarding a ruling are meaningless; by virtue of the clue of the unity of context, here we also say that what is meant is the external action.

First: If the criterion is the unity of context, all phrases must be taken into consideration, not [only] three phrases. What you said is meaningful with respect to three phrases, whereas we have three other phrases that certainly have no connection to the external action, namely: “omens (tiyarah), envy (hasad), and whisperings in contemplating creation (al-waswasah fi al-tafakkur fi al-khalq).” These are psychological states for the human and have nothing to do with the external.

Question: …

Professor: These are states; they are not in fact actions. The claim was that the relative pronoun ma is exclusive to particular doubts and external actions… We want to negate the exclusivity; currently, with this objection we raise, we did not set out to claim that this encompasses ruling-directed doubts; currently we only want to reject the claim of the exclusivity of the relative pronoun ma to external actions and particular doubts. “Omens, envy, and whisperings in contemplating creation” are all psychological states of the human and have nothing to do with the external action. If the issue is the unity of context, these must be taken into consideration. In other words, we do not have a single context that we would be obligated, for its sake, to interpret ma in “ma la ya’lamun” as external actions and restrict it to particular doubts.

Second: Even if we set aside the first objection and pay attention to the unity of context specifically in these three phrases, another matter also exists: namely, in “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh” and “ma-dturru ‘alayh”, coercion and necessity have attached to the relative pronoun itself. The result is that the attribution of the coerced object (mukrah ‘alayh) to, for example, coerced drinking of wine is a literal attribution, and there is no longer any medium between coercion and that action; or, for example, the attribution of the constrained object (mudtarr ‘alayh) to constrained drinking of wine is a literal attribution, and we no longer have a medium between necessity and action. These are clear. Now, if we want to take this unity of context into consideration in relation to “ma la ya’lamun”, we must claim the exclusivity of “ma la ya’lamun” to ruling-directed doubts; the opposite of the claimant’s position. Because ignorance (jahl), in this hypothesis, has attached directly and without any medium to the ruling of that action. If we say that the relative pronoun in “ma la ya’lamun” is exclusive to particular doubts, or even claim that it encompasses both ruling-directed and particular doubts, we can no longer attribute ignorance directly to the action itself; because regarding the liquid that is doubted whether it is wine or vinegar, there is no ignorance at all regarding the action itself, which consists of drinking. What is unknown is that we do not know whether this is drinking wine or drinking vinegar.

Therefore, if the unity of context is involved, to use my expression, things get ruined. In these very few cases we see these have attained a literal attribution; the constrained object has attained a literal attribution to constrained drinking of wine, and the same applies to the rest. Therefore, here we must ultimately commit to the exclusivity of the relative pronoun ma to ruling-directed doubts; we cannot even commit to it being broader, encompassing both particular and ruling-directed doubts.

Muhaqqiq Iraqi states: Now that the unity of context exists from several aspects (for example, we see from two angles that two unities of context exist), which one should we make the criterion? Can both be taken into consideration? This is not feasible because these two unities of context cannot be combined; therefore, we refer to ‘urf (common custom); ‘urf prefers the second unity of context.

The conclusion is that this is exclusive to ruling-directed doubts and does not encompass particular doubts.

Examination of Muhaqqiq Iraqi’s Statement

Envy, omens, and whisperings in contemplating creation—while it is true that they are psychological states, ultimately the title of action is applied to them; ultimately, these too are a type of action, except that their vessel is the domain of the soul. Therefore, in a sense, we can say that the unity of context is present; meaning that in all phrases except for “ma la ya’lamun”, the focus is on action, except that one is a bodily action (fi’l jawarihi) and the other is an inner action (fi’l jawanhi); therefore, in “ma la ya’lamun” as well, they make action the criterion.

So, the claimant who made the claim of the unity of context had his focus on the external action, not the absolute action; it is fundamentally clear that the inner action is not what he observed…

Question: …

Professor: This is a justification and an interpretation not satisfying to its author (tafsir bi-ma la yarda sahibuhu). The main thing is: what are these a clue for? … He claimed that in necessity and coercion, the issue of action is raised and the ruling cannot be what is intended … Coercion and necessity can have the external action as their object, but the inner action is certainly not intended, and fundamentally… We invented these school-based terms… Moral vices, these are all acquisitions of the human: ill suspicion, thinking of sin, these are all acquisitions of the human; mental thoughts are like this—can we say these are actions?

Discussion of the Next Session

Here, those who objected to this hadith and stated that it is exclusive to particular doubts sought to prove this matter through five paths; they said by these five proofs, evidences, clues, and paths (of course, this was stated by various individuals) this hadith is exclusive to particular doubts, and what is meant by ma is the doubted or unknown external action, and therefore we cannot argue on the basis of the hadith at all. We must examine these proofs to determine whether this hadith is exclusive to particular doubts or encompasses ruling-directed doubts as well.