The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof
Session Seventy-Six
The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, Second Topic: Examination of the Exclusivity or Non-Exclusivity of “ma” to Particular Doubts, The Five Paths, The Second Path, The Objection of Muhaqqiq Khoei to the Second Path, The Objection of Several Eminent Scholars to the Second Path, Commentary on the Treatise on Rights, The Right of Fasting: Knowing the Reality of Fasting, The Reality of Fasting: Controlling Physical and Mental Imports and Exports
January 21, 2026
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion was on the second path among the paths of proving the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts. The second path is the very unity of context (wahdat al-siyaq). As was stated, responses have been presented to this path. Muhaqqiq Iraqi raised two responses, which were examined. Another response was stated by Muhaqqiq Ha’iri, which is indeed a robust statement. The late Mr. Khoei also expressed almost the same points stated by Muhaqqiq Ha’iri, with a difference in expression and by citing other examples; otherwise, in reality, the spirit of his statement is also the same.
The Objection of Muhaqqiq Khoei to the Second Path
Mr. Khoei stated: the relative pronoun in all the phrases of this hadith is utilized in one and the same meaning, and that is the literal meaning of the relative pronoun, meaning “thing,” which is ambiguous; for this reason, they have classified the relative pronoun among the ambiguous nouns. However, this ambiguity is removed with the arrival of the conjunct clause (silah); the conjunct clause explains the relative pronoun.
On this basis, “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” is in the meaning of “lifted is the thing that they do not know” (rufi’a al-shay’u al-ladhi la ya’lamun), and “rufi’a ma la yatiqun” means “lifted is the thing they cannot bear” (rufi’a al-shay’u al-ladhi la yatiqun). Therefore, the relative pronoun in all these cases is utilized in one and the same meaning; however, each of these phrases, in the stage of application to the external instance, applies to something. For example, the coerced thing (al-mukrah ‘alayh) applies to the external action; meaning that thing regarding which you were coerced is lifted. That regarding which you were coerced is externally an action. However, this has nothing to do with the relative pronoun ma, but rather in the stage of application in the external world, it applies to action.
However, in the case of “ma la ya’lamun”, this phrase applies both to the ruling and to the action; it can apply to both. The reason for this is also the conjunct clause itself, because the conjunct clause in these cases is different, and this causes a difference in external application. Otherwise, ma in all these phrases is used in its very own literal meaning, namely, the ambiguous thing, and when we reach the stage of application in the external world, we observe that one refers to action and the other to both action and ruling; it can be either the unknown action or the ruling.
Then he gives an example and says: For example, if it is said: “that which Zayd left belongs to his heir” (ma taraka Zaydun fa-li-warathatih), and it is also said: “that which Umar left belongs to his heir,” and also: “that which Khalid left belongs to his heir,” here the unity of context is preserved. Ma in all these cases is one and the same thing, but in the stage of application in the external world, sometimes that “which was left” refers to a house because Zayd has nothing but a house, sometimes it refers to land because Umar has nothing but land, and sometimes it refers to trees and a garden because Khalid has nothing but a garden and trees. This does not cause a difference in context, because what relates to the application in the external world has no connection to the context of the sentence and the phrases of this hadith, and ma in all these phrases is used in one and the same meaning; therefore, the issue of proving the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts on the basis of the unity of context is ruled out.
The spirit of this explanation is identical to that of Muhaqqiq Ha’iri, and this is a robust statement and we can accept it as well.
Up to this point, we have mentioned the second path and also explained three responses to this path; apart from the response of Muhaqqiq Iraqi—which was objected to in both parts of his statement—the responses of Muhaqqiq Ha’iri and the late Mr. Khoei seem acceptable.
The Fourth Response to the Second Path
Another response has also been transmitted by the author of Muntaqa al-Usul, and of course, he has subjected it to objection. Please pay attention to what the essence of the response is, so that we may subsequently see whether the objection directed at this response is correct or not.
The second path, on the basis of the unity of context, seeks to prove the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts. The fourth response is based on distinguishing between “utilizational intent” (iradah isti’maliyyah) and “serious intent” (iradah jiddiyyah). In the sense that: does the unity of context exist in the utilizational intent or in the serious intent? and we must see in which of these two intents lies that which can prove the exclusivity. This is the core of his response.
However, the essence of the statement is that he says: in the phrases of this narration, in terms of the utilizational intent in ma, there is no difference between these phrases. That is, the relative pronoun ma in “ma la ya’lamun”, “ma la yatiqun”, “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh”, and “ma-dturru ilayh” is utilized in one and the same thing. In ma, there is a utilizational intent that is identical in all these cases. However, there is also a serious intent here, and there is a difference between those serious intents, and there the unity of context does not exist. For example, the serious intent in “ma-dturru ilayh” has attached to action. Meaning when he says “lifted from my nation is that which they are constrained to,” it means what has been lifted from the nation is that very constrained action. And likewise in “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh”, and likewise in “ma la yatiqun”; in all these, the serious intent has attached to action. However, in “ma la ya’lamun”, the serious intent attaches both to the action and to the ruling.
That unity of context which the claimant argued based upon exists in the utilizational intent, but this does not contradict that they may differ in the serious intent. When the serious intent is different, then what is meant by “ma la ya’lamun” can be both particular doubts and ruling-directed doubts.
In this response, he wants to say that the unity of context exists, but the unity of context does not cause us to say that in all phrases of this hadith the intended thing is the external action; because the unity of context relates to the utilizational intent. However, as to whether what is intended in these phrases is action, ruling, or both, this relates to the serious intent of the speaker. Therefore, no flaw or doubt is cast upon the inclusion of the Hadith of Lifting with respect to rulings, or in other words, with respect to ruling-directed doubts.
Question: …
Professor: Indeed, if we consider the utilizational intent in all these phrases to be “the ambiguous thing,” there is no trace of action or subject in it. However, when it is placed within the scope of the serious intent, it encompasses both… No, it does not necessarily correspond.
The difference between this response and the responses of Muhaqqiq Iraqi and Muhaqqiq Khoei lies in this very point. In those two responses, they took the difference to the stage of external application; they said the meaning is one and the same everywhere, the utilized meaning (mustamalun fih) is unified, but when it relates to external application, in one place it becomes action, and in another place, both. The focus of those two responses was on this—meaning they removed the matter from the stage of utilization and from the scope of speech; however, this response has gone back somewhat earlier. That is, it wants to say: prior to reaching the stage of external application, basically it has nothing to do with whether in the external world it applies to action or attaches to the ruling. It says: the speaker himself, his serious intent in one place has attached to action, and in another place to what is broader, encompassing both action and ruling.
This is like the connected (muttasil) and disconnected (munfasil) clues in the speaker’s words. If we say this is serious intent, naturally we cannot distinguish between the serious intent and the utilizational intent without a clue. If there is no clue, yes, as you say, we must rule on their correspondence. However, when a clue exists, we are forced to create this difference. In this case, we can no longer return to the principle of the correspondence of the serious intent and the utilizational intent.
The relative pronoun ma has a general meaning that encompasses any unknown thing (including the ruling and the action, ruling-directed doubts and particular doubts). In the other cases, such as “ma la ya’lamun”, “ma la yatiqun”, “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh”, and “ma-dturru ilayh”, it is also like this. However, we see that in “ma la yatiqun”, the ruling cannot be what is intended; because fundamentally the attachment of ability to the ruling is meaningless. Therefore, we are forced to limit it; meaning with this clue, the serious intent of the speaker becomes clear—that the attachment of ability to the ruling is meaningless, so we are forced to limit it, and therefore we say the serious intent is only action. And likewise in the case of coercion and necessity; coercion regarding a ruling, it is known, is meaningless. This itself becomes a clue—it is not a verbal clue, but ultimately it is a clue, and it is also a connected clue that determines our duty here. However, in “ma la ya’lamun”, there is no constraint at all that ignorance, for example, should attach both to the ruling and to the action, even if it is mediated.
This response has been objected to by the author of Muntaqa [al-Usul].
Commentary on the Treatise on Rights
We mentioned that Imam Sajjad (PBUH) stated that the right of fasting is that you know: “that it is a veil that Allah has placed over your tongue, your hearing, your sight, your private parts, and your stomach…”
In the past sessions, we explained what importance fasting has, and also explained what it fundamentally means for an act of worship to possess a right. Now, this makes no difference; whether it is fasting, prayer, or pilgrimage (hajj). Any act of worship that is to possess a right must be conceptualized. Fundamentally, how does an act of worship possess a right?
The Right of Fasting: Knowing the Reality of Fasting
Regarding fasting, as in the previous cases, the first and most important right of fasting, just like other acts of worship, is knowing the reality of fasting. He says: “that you know” (fa-an ta’lama). He does not say the right of fasting is that you do not eat, do not drink, or do not do this. The Imam could have said: “And as for the right of fasting: your abstaining from food and drink…” That is the fasting itself. But what is the right of fasting? He says: “that you know.” Recognizing the position of fasting is the most important right of fasting. In the case of prayer, too: “if you know that it is such-and-such”; in the case of hajj, also like this. The most important right of any act of worship is the recognition of that act of worship.
Here, he did not say “that you know what fasting is”; he explained it himself and says: “that you know that it is a veil.” You see, truly recognition and knowing, which have been emphasized so much—so many traditions emphasize contemplating and reflecting on the divine verses and on the matter of religion, deep understanding (tafaffuh) of religion—is because fundamentally it turns human life upside down. Someone who is only committed to rituals without recognition is different from someone who attains the realities from the depth of his soul. Recognizing the reality of fasting is the most important right of fasting.
The Reality of Fasting: Controlling Physical and Mental Imports and Exports
What are we to understand? Prior to fasting, “that you know it is a veil that Allah has placed over your tongue, your hearing, your sight, your private parts, and your stomach.” He says: this is a veil and a screen that Allah places over your tongue, your hearing, your sight, your private parts, and your stomach. Although they did not mention “watch your hearing” among the obligations of fasting; what they have mentioned as the nullifiers (mubtilat) of fasting is known, they have mentioned about ten or eleven cases as the nullifiers of fasting. What invalidates fasting is that, but the reality of fasting is beyond these. The Imam states: the reality of fasting is a veil that is drawn over human organs and limbs. What are these organs? These organs are all the entry channels of the human body and soul. Both its imports and its exports.
Our body has intakes from a physical perspective, just as it also has discharges. The human body consumes food, and after undergoing stages, discharges this food. However, it also has intakes through the ear and the eye. The human ear, which hears something, and this occupies a place in the human mind, is similar to the food a human consumes and goes to the digestive system; the human’s hearings also go to the digestive system of the mind. The human eye, which sees something, places it in the mind, except that sometimes operations are performed on this image; these images turn into imaginings and thus spawn further thoughts. Both hearings and sightings. When we say it spawns, it means the human can perform thousands of things with these intakes. These are the intakes of the human mind, psyche, and soul.
However, it also has exports; it also has discharges. The human, with the tongue, can pour out what he has received in his mind. This absorption and discharge is both in our body and in our soul. The stomach has absorption and discharge. The private parts also have absorption (nourishments) and discharge. The eye, ear, and tongue—these are the gateways for data to enter the mind; meaning taking photos, filming, and hearing. Whatever you see in the street or hear throughout the day, at that very moment, goes to the mind and is placed somewhere. It then depends on how much you yourself pay attention to keeping it. This can be a useful scientific matter, it can be a void or futile matter, it can be—God forbid—an incorrect image. These can remain raw in this manner, or mental operations can be performed on them. This too is in the hands of the human himself.
The stronger the human’s power in controlling the inputs, the more self-controlled the human is. The more this power decreases and the more abandonment there is, the more difficult the task. However, if a gateway has a door, possesses a veil, and is controlled, then the power and capacity of the human over himself is greater.
The Commander of the Faithful (PBUH) says regarding fasting: “As a calming of their limbs, a humbling of their eyes, a humiliation of their souls, and a lowering of their hearts”; fasting is in reality so that people calm their limbs from sin, make their eyes humble, humble and humiliate their souls, and lower their hearts from seeking superiority and arrogance. This is the reality of fasting.
Imam Sajjad (PBUH) states this very thing and says: this is a veil that Allah, Blessed and Exalted is He, placed over these organs; organs that are the paths of physical and mental imports. Meaning if the human can control these mental and physical imports, he has done a highly important thing. Once a year, Allah made fasting obligatory upon the human in order to control these mental imports. Fasting is an exercise for controlling mental and physical imports. Therefore, you see that even a series of halal and permissible matters become disallowed, let alone forbidden matters which are in their own place…